Pillole di economia: Distorsività della tassazione progressiva per classi

Grafico

La teoria economica dell’imposizione fiscale pone il trade-off tra efficienza ed equità al centro del dibattito. Gli strumenti fiscali, quali imposte, tasse e tariffe, pur contribuendo alla riduzione dell'efficienza economica, possono promuovere una distribuzione più equa delle risorse post-imposizione...

Leggi di più

Featured research

Abrardi, L., Colombo L., Tedeschi, P. 2025. “Pretending Ignorance is Bliss: Competing Insurers with Heterogeneous Informational Advantages”, The Review of Financial Studies, 38 (7): 2005-2033

The availability of big data and analytics expertise provides insurers with an informative advantage over policyholders in estimating risk. We study competition between heterogeneously informed insurers, showing that their information may or not be revealed in equilibrium. We find that all equilibria are profitable and that non-informative equilibria entail risk pooling and possibly efficiency. In informative equilibria, the signaling problem interacts with the screening problem that arises endogenously from insurers' revelation of information, implying underinsurance. Our main insights are robust to changes in insurers' information precision and market concentration, and to the presence of two-sided asymmetric information and withdrawable contracts.

Nome file
economia-finanza-Estratto per sito.pdf
Dimensione
47 KB
Formato
application/pdf
Leggi di più
scroll-top-icon