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Evidence from the Cuban Missile Crisis**

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The Political Effects of Threats to the Nation: Evidence from the Cuban Missile Crisis *

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Abstract

This paper investigates how voters respond to threats to the nation by estimating the political effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis. To establish causality, I exploit the geographical variation induced by the range of the missiles: only U.S. localities within 1,000 nautical miles from Cuba could be targeted. Difference-in-differences regressions show that target counties experienced an increase in voter turnout and support for the incumbent President's party by 5 and 3 percentage points, respectively. Finally, I find positive effects of the crisis on representatives' support for military spending and foreign intervention and on Americans' probability to serve in Vietnam.

JEL Codes: D72, D74, H56, D91

Keywords: Voting Behavior, International Crises, Cuban Missile Crisis.

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1 INTRODUCTION

What are the political consequences of external threats to the nation? Theories of retrospective voting suggest that voters reward incumbent politicians for desirable outcomes of government policies (Fiorina, 1981; Healy & Malhotra, 2013). The empirical literature in political economy finds that voters retrospectively respond to economic policies that affect their personal economic fortunes, such as targeted government transfers (Levitt & Snyder, 1997; Manacorda *et al.*, 2011; Solé-Ollé & Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). Whether threats to the nation prompt retrospective voting is still debated as it becomes particularly challenging to isolate voters' policy judgements from the direct effect of casualties and emotions on electoral results (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Elster, 2019; Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Karol & Miguel, 2007; Montalvo, 2011).¹

This paper complements this debate by empirically investigating voters' response to one of the most severe international crises in American history: the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the weeks preceding the 1962 United States elections, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a dramatic 13-day political and military standoff about Soviet nuclear missile deployment in Cuba. In a televised address on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy informed the American people that Soviet missiles were discovered in Cuba; these missiles were "capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles" and thus striking any city in the southeastern part of the United States. Fear of nuclear war swept the globe, eventually raising the level of Defense Condition to DEFCON 2, before an agreement between the two nations was reached and the crisis peacefully resolved 8 days

¹ Several studies investigating the effect of wars and terrorism on incumbents' political support obtain results consistent with retrospective voting theory. For instance, Karol & Miguel (2007) show that the number of US soldiers casualties in Iraq significantly lowered President Bush's vote share in 2004 elections; similarly, Montalvo (2011) finds that terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 in Spain largely reduced the vote share for the incumbent's party. On the other hand, Berrebi & Klor (2008) show that incumbent politicians in Israel are not punished for suicide attacks; along the same lines, Getmansky & Zeitzoff (2014) find that being in the range of Gaza rocket fire did not affect incumbents' electoral results and it rewarded parties that have a valence advantage over national security issues, e.g. *Likud*. Elster (2019) uses data on actual missile strikes in Israel and finds that the reason of the increased support for the Likud is not the mere threat, but the exposure to actual attacks.

before the date of the elections.²

I exploit this episode of American history as a natural experiment that generated a shock to the salience of a military threat just before an election, while having no impact on the safety of the civilian population. My research design relies on two features of the crisis particularly useful for identifying its effects on electoral outcomes. First, I exploit the geographical variation induced by Soviet missile range: only areas located within 1,000 nautical miles (i.e. 1,150 miles) from Cuba could have been hit; this episode generated panic and fear of nuclear war across the whole country, but only people residing in the peril area were the ones directly threatened. Historical surveys provide first-stage evidence that people living within the range of the missiles experienced rising fear and concern over the Cuban situation following President Kennedy's address to the nation. Second, the proximity of the crisis to the election day mitigates concerns regarding potential changes in the composition of the electorate and in the selection of congressional candidates.

To estimate the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on electoral outcomes, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy that compares electoral results of counties within 1,000 nautical miles from Cuba (*target*) to those outside this range (*non-target*) before and after the crisis. For this empirical investigation, I combine datasets from several sources, including county-level data on US House of Representatives' electoral results, data from the U.S. decennial Census of the population, and precise information on the location of Soviet missile launching sites in Cuba.

Regression results show that voter turnout increased in the whole country. Citizens bearing the highest potential cost of the crisis, i.e. those living in target counties, were the ones who reacted the most: relative to non-target counties, target counties experienced an increase in political participation between 1958 and 1962 of about 30 percent, corresponding to a 5 percentage point raise in voter turnout. Political participation further increased in

² The defense readiness condition (DEFCON) is an alert state used by the United States Armed Forces. DEFCON level ranges from 1 (most severe, i.e. imminent nuclear war) to 5 (least severe). The only times DEFCON reached level 2, i.e. the maximum level ever registered since World War II, was during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

counties that were perceived as likely targets, such as those where most populated cities or military bases were located. A set of robustness checks shows that there were no diverging trends in electoral outcomes between target and non-target areas before the occurrence of the crisis, and further dismiss the role of potential confounders in driving the estimates, such as black enfranchisement and the Republicans' southern strategy (Ang, 2019; Cascio & Washington, 2013; Kuziemko & Washington, 2018). I finally corroborate these findings by employing a panel spatial regression discontinuity design, which compares counties just outside and within the missile range over time, obtaining qualitatively similar estimated effects.

To disentangle among potential mechanisms behind these results, I analyse changes in parties' vote shares. I find that the Democrats increased their vote share in target counties by about 3 percentage points; on the contrary, Republicans did not gain additional votes in target areas. The support for the Democrats does not differentially change with their vote shares in past elections nor with the presence of an incumbent candidate; further, there is no differential effect in counties where democratic representative voted for more strict sanctions against Cuba. These findings are mainly consistent with a psychologically based model of retrospective voting (Achen & Bartels, 2004; Healy & Lenz, 2014): voters rely on cognitive short-cuts when making voting decisions, ultimately putting excessive weights on salient and recent events (Bordalo *et al.*, 2013); President Kennedy's management of the crisis and its peaceful resolution, may have led voters to vote for Democratic candidates, independently of their past performances.³ Historical survey analysis seems to confirm this interpretation and helps dismissing other plausible explanations, such as *rally-round-the-flag* (Mueller, 1970, 1973), tightness of social norms (Winkler, 2021), and issue valence (Wright, 2012).

Voters' reactions to external threats may influence the support for government policies aimed at combating the external enemy and increasing national security (Huddy *et al.*, 2007).

³ Still, I cannot rule out that target counties voters voted and supported the Democratic candidate out of gratitude to the leader in charge (Manacorda *et al.*, 2011; Rabin, 1993).

Consistently with this theory, I first find that U.S. House representatives from target electoral districts were more likely to vote in support of military and foreign-policy spending after the crisis took place; similarly, they were also more likely to vote in favor of resolutions promoting aggressive policies towards Communist countries, including military interventions. I then show that the share of Vietnam-era veterans in 1970 discontinuously changes in counties at the proximity of the threshold delimiting the range of the missiles; the same discontinuity does not appear for wars that took place before the Cuban Missile Crisis, e.g. the Korean War. While the crisis did not have persistent electoral effects, these last findings suggest that it had an impact on American involvement in Vietnam war.

This paper shows that a particularly dramatic international crisis is likely to affect voter behavior and political outcomes thus contributing to different strands of the extant literature. First, by showing that threats to the nation prompt retrospective voting, it confirms findings from other settings on how citizens assign credit and blame politicians for changes in their well-being (Manacorda *et al.*, 2011; Pop-Eleches *et al.*, 2012) and even for events outside their control that happened during their mandate (Achen & Bartels, 2004; Cole *et al.*, 2012; Wolfers, 2009).⁴ Second, this paper contributes to the growing literature on the impact of threats to the nation - from war, terrorism, or diseases - on voter behavior (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Montalvo, 2011; Peri *et al.*, 2021); recent research shows that fear of a pandemic leads voters to express conservative political attitudes and thus vote for candidates associated to conservative parties (Beall *et al.*, 2016; Campante *et al.*, 2020).⁵ As the Cuban Missile Crisis ended with no casualties among the civilian population, I am able to uncover the electoral effects of a peaceful resolution of an international crisis, ultimately distinguishing them from the ones due to bombing, war, and destruction (Bauer *et al.*,

⁴ Wolfers (2009) show that voters are only partially able to evaluate their governments as they do not correctly distinguish political competence from exogenous shocks outside the control of a politician.

⁵ In particular, Campante *et al.* (2020) estimate the causal effect of increased concerns over an Ebola outbreak in the U.S. on the 2014 midterm election's results: the salience of the Ebola threat led to a lower vote share for the Democrats and to increasingly conservative attitudes of voters on immigration issues. Beall *et al.* (2016) additionally find that the Ebola scare increased voters' inclination to conform to popular opinion.

2016; Bellows & Miguel, 2009; Blattman, 2009).⁶ Third, the findings of this paper speak to the social psychology literature and social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986): attacks against the nation trigger in-group bias, i.e. positive views of the group to which individuals belong, which reinforces any symbolic representation of the in-group, including political participation and support for the leader (Gehring, 2020; Lambert *et al.*, 2010). Finally, this paper is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the first studies that uses observational data to establish a causal link between Cold War threats and political outcomes in the United States (Bordalo *et al.*, 2020).⁷ Existing papers in political science, including those investigating the public response to the Cuban Missile Crisis (Caplovitz, 1963; George, 2004), mainly provide correlational evidence finding inconclusive results (McCormick & Wittkopf, 1990; Meernik, 1993).

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the events that took place during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy. Section 5 examines the effects of the Cuban Missile Crisis on electoral and policy outcomes, ultimately analyzing the mechanisms behind the estimated effects. Section 6 concludes.

2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Cuban Missile Crisis is often credited as the closest brush with nuclear war in American history (McKeown, 2000). On October 14, 1962 an U.S. Air Force reconnaissance plane discovered the existence of Soviet medium-range missiles in a site near San Cristobal, 100 miles west of Havana.⁸ Within hours of being informed about this nuclear threat, President

⁶ The only fatality by enemy fire during the Cuban Missile Crisis was United States Air Force pilot Rudolf Anderson, who died when his U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba on October 27, 1962.

⁷ Bordalo *et al.* (2020) show that the end of the Cold War shifted American voters' attention away from external threats. This phenomenon increased perceived partisan differences on domestic issues, ultimately increasing polarization.

⁸ Figure A.1 shows the exact location of the missile site in San Diego de Los Banos, in the proximity of the city of San Cristobal

Kennedy summoned his closest advisers, a group known as *ExComm*, to monitor the crisis and assess appropriate responses. After considering several options, including an air strike and a full-scale invasion of Cuba, Kennedy eventually decided upon a middle course: on October 22, he ordered a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba. The same day, the President went on national television to inform American citizens of the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba, his decision to enforce a quarantine, and the potential risk of nuclear war. In his speech to the nation, Kennedy announced:

“[...] medium range ballistic missiles are capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 nautical miles. Each of these missiles is capable of striking D.C., [...] or any other city in the southeastern part of the US”.

As shown in Figure A.2 of the Appendix, newspapers across the country reported the map of the range of the missiles and target urban areas.⁹ These articles show maps of the U.S. with the range of the missiles already operational in Cuba (the inner-circle) and the one of the missiles still under-construction (the outer-circle). Figure A.3 further reports journal articles for a few local newspapers that indicates whether their readers were under direct threat.

The announcement of the President initially came as a shock and it quickly turned into panic as the crisis worsened. Fear of imminent nuclear exchange swept across the nation, in particular among people within missile range and thus facing a high risk of death in case of a nuclear strike (Smith, 2003; Stern, 2012). Anecdotal evidence shows episodes of mass public panic: people rushed to grocery stores to buy and stock non-perishable food in basement or fallout shelter; special church services were also held during the crisis, as many believed the end of the world was coming (George, 2004). Raschky & Wang (2017) further show that individuals living within the range of the missiles engaged in leisure and reproductive

⁹ Figure A.2 gathers a selection of articles published on October 23, 1962, in several newspapers from different areas of the United States; these are The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, The Miami News, The St. Louis Dispatch, The Philadelphia Inquirer, and The Charlotte Observer. These articles can be accessed from the website www.newspapers.com.

activities as a response to the high mortality risks: fertility in states close to Cuba increased nine months after the occurrence of the crisis.

On October 24, Khrushchev responded to Kennedy’s message declaring the naval quarantine was an act of aggression and that Soviet ships were ordered to proceed to Cuba. Tension increased and the U.S. raised the readiness level of U.S. army to DEFCON 2, i.e. “next step to nuclear war”. After dramatic confrontations, the leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union found a way out of the impasse. Khrushchev agreed to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.S. leaders not to invade Cuba. Kennedy administration further secretly agreed to dismantle U.S. missile installations in Turkey. On October 28, the Cuban Missile Crisis drew to a close. President Kennedy emerged as a clear winner to the public eye. Figure 1 shows Presidential approval ratings over February 1961 and November 1963.¹⁰ While Kennedy’s popularity was declining since the Bay of Pigs episode, approval ratings peaked in October 24, 1962 when Americans were informed about the Soviet missiles in Cuba.

3 DATA

I draw from a number of data sources to construct the sample for the analysis to follow.

ELECTORAL OUTCOMES. I obtained data on the U.S. House of Representatives’ electoral results over the 1952-1978 period from the *General Election Data for the United States* provided by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. This data collection consists of county-level information on outcomes for presidential, midterm, and gubernatorial elections in the United States (ICPSR, 2013). The dataset includes the total number of votes in each election as well as votes to the Republican and Democratic parties. Information on voting outcomes is missing in states where the electoral law does not

¹⁰ These data are publicly available at Gallup Presidential Job Approval Center.

require to tabulate votes for unopposed elections, i.e. Arkansas and Kentucky.¹¹ In order to construct a measure of voter turnout, I retrieved county-level voting age populations for 1950, 1960 and 1970 from National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) and I then log-interpolated this variable in the intercensal years.¹²

COUNTY CHARACTERISTICS. The *1960 City and County Data Book Consolidated File, County Data 1947-1977*, provides a variety of information on all counties in the U.S. for the period 1944 to 1977. The dataset includes information on several characteristics of the population, including race, age, gender, schooling, labor force, employment, family income, and family characteristics. (ICPSR, 2012). I finally geo-located the 2,924 counties with non-missing information on electoral results and computed their distance from the medium range ballistic missile base (MRBM) in San Cristobal, Cuba, i.e. the launching site spotted on October 14, 1962. Figure 2 shows a map of US counties, which have been colored according to their orthodromic distance to San Cristobal: dark-grey areas are counties that could have been hit by a Soviet missile (*target*), i.e. within 1,000 nautical miles (1,150 miles) from Cuba.¹³ Figure 2 also plots the 100 most populated cities in the US according to the 1960 Census.

DESCRIPTIVES. Table 1 provides descriptives of population characteristics retrieved from the 1950 Census for both target and non-target counties. There are significant differences in most of the variables analyzed between these two groups of counties. In 1950, target counties on average had larger shares of black population (23 percent versus 3 percent elsewhere), higher infant mortality rates (0.04 percent versus 0.03 percent), and lower median years of schooling (7.76 versus 9.47). Moreover target counties have a lower median family income

¹¹ State level information is still available but it only reflects voting in non-opposed elections (US Census Bureau, 1962).

¹² Cascio & Washington (2013) assumed voting age to be the same across all U.S. states, i.e. 21 years. Due to data restrictions that only provide population by age group in 1950, I had to assume voting age to be 20 years.

¹³ To compute great-circle distances, I set a sphere with a radius of 3959 miles to approximate the shape of the earth. The coordinates of the MRBM base are:(22°38'35.3"N 83°21'59.5"W).

(1,704 versus 2,705 USD) and lower labor market participation (34 percent versus 38 percent) than non-target counties.

More importantly, there were significant differences in 1958 electoral outcomes. The average turnout was 28 point lower in target counties, which also shown a larger support for the democratic party with respect to non-target counties. As shown by Cascio & Washington (2013), most of the target counties had literacy tests at voter registration, which impeded a significant portion of the southern population, mainly black voters, from registering to vote.

4 IDENTIFICATION

To identify the causal effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on political outcomes, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. The range of Soviet missiles generates a variation in the areas that could have been targeted and those that could have not. As shown in Figure 2, target counties are those located within 1,000 nautical miles from the medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) base in San Cristobal, Cuba. The empirical strategy compares changes in electoral outcomes in target counties to changes in non-target counties, before and after the crisis. I estimate the effects of interest by running the following specification:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{After}_t + \beta_2 \textit{Target}_i + \beta_3 \textit{After}_t \times \textit{Target}_i + \beta'_{4t} X_{i,1950} + \lambda_t + \eta_i + e_{it} \quad (1)$$

where y_{it} is any political outcomes in county i and election date t . *After* indicates elections that took place after the crisis; the coefficient β_1 tells us whether elections that took place in 1962 (and after) saw a change in the outcome analyzed. *Target* indicates if the county's centroid is located within 1,000 nautical miles (1,150 miles) from Cuba; the associated coefficient β_2 captures differences in levels of the outcome y between treated and control counties. Our parameter of interest is thus β_3 that indicates the differential effect in the electoral outcome y in target counties relative to non-target ones after the Cuban

Missile Crisis.

County fixed effects, η_i , control for variation in y across counties that is constant over time, for example as a result of time-invariant voting differences or as a result of pre-existing differences in social and economic outcomes. Year fixed effects, λ_t control for variation in electoral outcomes over elections that is common across counties; since this empirical strategy exploits the panel nature of the data, it does not require balance in levels between target and non-target counties. The specification also includes a set of baseline county characteristics interacted with year dummies, i.e. $\beta_{4t}X_{i,1950}$, thus allowing to control for differential treatment effects depending on baseline county characteristics.¹⁴

The identification of coefficient β_3 thus relies on the common trend assumption: voting outcomes in target and non-target areas followed the same trends before 1962; I provide formal tests for this identification assumption by showing no differences in outcomes trends between the two groups before the occurrence of the crisis. Additionally, no other event affected voting in target counties in 1962 other than the occurrence of the crisis; I present regression results aimed at dismissing potential confounders, such as the increasing number of Southerner Republican contestants and black enfranchisement in the South. Finally, to account for potential correlation of standard errors within voters of the same state, I cluster standard errors at the state level.

5 RESULTS

This section first provides first-stage evidence on increased salience of the Soviet threat in target counties. I then present estimates of the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on political participation. To disentangle between the potential mechanisms at play, I analyze changes in

¹⁴ The baseline control variables come from the 1950 U.S. Population Census; these are: log population, log area (km²), log family size, share of black residents, share of persons under age 5 and above 65, infant mortality, median years of schooling, share of population aged 14-17 enrolled in high school, log family income, log labor force to population ratio, log employment rate, log bank deposits p.c., and share of households with radio.

votes to the Democratic and Republican party as well as historical survey data. I eventually estimate the impact of the crisis on policy and social outcomes.

5.1 FIRST-STAGE EVIDENCE

The empirical analysis of this paper is based on the assumption that the threat was more salient among people living in target areas than those living outside the missile range. I thus analyze historical survey data in order to provide first-stage evidence of increasing fear and concern over Cuba before and after the crisis between target and non-target areas. I use data from public opinion polls which were made available online by the Roper Center at Cornell. In particular, I exploit information from Gallup, which established the American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO) in order to conduct nationwide surveys of American opinions on a wide range of social and political issues (Kuziemko & Washington, 2018). The final sample is a repeated cross-section, consisting of six monthly surveys conducted between July and December 1962. The data offer information on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of more than 22,000 respondents, including their state of residence.

I first focus on the question that asks “*What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?*”; among possible answers, there is “*Cuba/ Cuban Problem*”. I thus run a regression in which the share of population in each state living within the missile range has been interacted with time (i.e. interview month) dummies.¹⁵ Figure 3 shows how concerns about Cuba suddenly increase after President Kennedy’s speech to the nation in October 22.¹⁶ Before the President went on national television, there were no differences in concerns over Cuba between respondents living within and outside the missile range; they turned positive in October and November and started declining in December when the Soviet started dismantling their launching sites in Cuba.¹⁷ I use answers on other problems

¹⁵ I computed the share of population under threat using the 1960 Population Census.

¹⁶ The October poll does not provide the exact interview date; interviews took place between October 19-24, 1962.

¹⁷ Table A.1 shows regressions in which the interview-month dummies have been replaced by a dummy *After* equal to one for the months October-December. In Column (1) no control is included, in Column

in the country, such as farm and farm prices, racial segregation, and unemployment, to test if people in target areas generally became more concerned after the crisis. Respondents living in target areas do not seem to change their concern over these last issues in the aftermath of the crisis.

The second question I analyze is the one that asks “*In recent days, how much would you say you have worried about the problems facing this country?*”; possible answers include “*a great deal, some, very little, or none at all*”. Unfortunately, this second question is only available in one survey, November 1962, just after the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis. I nevertheless obtain an interesting correlation: people living in target counties have worried more than the rest of the population in the days following the crisis (see Columns (3) and (4) of Table A.1 in the Appendix).¹⁸

5.2 THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

MAIN RESULTS. Table 2 reports difference-in-differences estimates in which the dependent variable is either the log number of votes (Panel A) or voter turnout (Panel B). I first estimate equation (1) by using electoral results of the U.S. House of Representatives midterm elections in 1958 and 1962 (Columns 1-4), I then add all midterm elections between 1954 and 1978 (Columns 5-6). Unconditional estimates are reported in Column (1): political participation between 1958 and 1962, measured by the (log) number of votes, increased by more than 36% in target counties. Table 2 further shows that the change in political participation was also positive in non-target counties, i.e. 7.6% increase. The inclusion of county characteristics as of 1950 Population Census interacted with year dummies (Column 2) slightly affects the estimated coefficients: differential trends in the outcome of interest

(2) I added individual controls for age, gender, ethnic group, education, income group and city size, as well as state and month of the interview fixed effects.

¹⁸ The dependent variable is equal to one if interviewed individuals respond “a great deal” to the question “*In recent days, how much would you say you have worried about the problems facing this country?*”. Column (3) does not include any control; I added individual controls for age, gender, ethnic group, education, income group and city size in Column (4).

between counties with different characteristics of the population do not seem to drive the results. Finally, adding county fixed effects into the regression leaves the estimates almost unchanged. The threat of the Soviet missiles improved political participation in target counties by roughly 31% (Panel A), i.e. 4.8 percentage points increase in voter turnout (Panel B). Replacing the target dummy with the log distance of each county from Cuba (Column 4) does not change the significance nor the sign of the estimated effects: results show that doubling the distance from Cuba decreases turnout by about 51% (Panel A) corresponding to a 7.7 percentage point decrease in voter turnout (Panel B).

Results are robust to the inclusion of additional election years: the estimated effect of the crisis slightly increases, i.e. Columns (4) and (5). However, expanding the sample to 1966-78 may be problematic for several reasons; first, the coefficient β_3 may capture the effect of other shocks that affected the same areas, such as the voting Rights Act of 1965 that significantly increased black voter registration in Southern states (Cascio & Washington, 2013). Second, migration movements following the crisis may change the composition of the electorate; while it is unlikely that voters moved and registered in other states in the few days from the beginning of the crisis to the election date in 1962, it may be the case that the threat of the missiles may have affected location decisions of some subgroups of the target population in the long run.¹⁹ For these reasons, the preferred specification only employs data from 1958 and 1962 elections.

Overall, these findings show that the Cuban Missile Crisis spurred political engagement. Political participation increased in the whole country, but voters living under the threat of Soviet missiles responded the most by turning out to vote. These results confirm findings from other settings that perceived threats can mobilize voters, especially those for which the threat is more salient (Miller & Krosnick, 2004).

¹⁹ Anecdotal evidence however suggests that people living in target areas may have temporarily left their homes during the crisis and therefore did not go to the polls (George, 2004); if this is the case, regression results represent a lower bound estimate of the true effect of the crisis on political participation.

HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS. To support this last argument, I perform an heterogeneity analysis based on several county characteristics. In particular, I am interested in testing if political participation increased the most in counties in which the threat was more salient, i.e. where the perceived risk of being attacked was higher. Therefore, I run regressions in which the treatment $After \times Target$ has been interacted with a set of county variables at a time. In Panel A of Table 3, the dependent variable is the log number of votes, while in Panel B it is voter turnout. In Column (1) the treatment is interacted with a dummy indicating if the county included one of the 100 most populated cities in 1960. The triple interaction coefficient indicates that the effect on turnout almost doubles in big cities within the missile range in 1962. Interestingly, the double interaction coefficient $After \times Top100\ City$ is small and not statistically significant, thus implying that largest urban areas outside the peril area did not experience any change in political participation between 1958 and 1962. In Column (2), I perform the same exercise by interacting the treatment effect with a dummy indicating if a U.S. military base was present; results are qualitatively similar to the ones reported in Column (1). Overall, these findings confirm that political participation further increased in counties that were perceived as likely targets either because of the presence of a large urban area or a military installation.

COMMON TRENDS. The obvious concern with difference-in-differences regressions is the violation of the common trend assumption: the coefficient β_3 estimates the causal effect of the crisis on electoral outcomes only under the assumption of no diverging trends in the outcome of interest between target and non-target counties. In order to formally test whether this assumption holds, I estimate the difference-in-differences coefficient separately for each midterm election over the 1954-1978 period. I thus run the following regressions:

$$y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{t=1954}^{1978} \gamma_t Target_i \times t + \delta'_{4t} X_{i,1950} + \lambda_t + \eta_i + u_{it} \quad (2)$$

where λ_t and η_i are year and county fixed effects respectively. The variable t represents a dummy for each election year between 1954 and 1978, where 1954 is the excluded category. Further, county baseline characteristics have been interacted with year dummies, $\delta_{4t}X_{i,1950}$. Estimates of annual coefficients in Figure 4 indicate that the observed increase in turnout cannot be explained by differential pre-trends. Annual coefficients for both (log) number of votes and voter turnout are close to zero before 1962 and increase in 1962; these estimates remain positive and significant in the subsequent midterm elections. As an additional check, I estimate equation for presidential elections from 1952-1976. Results are reported in Figure A.4: there is no evidence of diverging pre-trends before the Cuban Missile Crisis, participation starts to increase only after 1960.

ENFRANCHISEMENT OF BLACK VOTERS. The pattern presented in Figure 4 may indicate a persistent effect of the crisis on political participation; however, it could also be the effect of other policies implemented after 1962 in target areas, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which removed literacy tests as a barrier to black citizens' political participation in the seven Southern states that ever adopted it.²⁰ This Act was one of the most effective pieces of civil rights legislation in U.S. history, increasing black voter registration rates and voter turnout (Cascio & Washington, 2013). One potential concern is then that the change in political participation between 1958 and 1962 in target counties is driven by the increased political engagement of black citizens that ultimately led to passing of the Voting Right Act in 1965. I propose two approaches to mitigate this concern. I first remove from the sample the seven Southern states that abolished the literacy test in 1965, i.e. the states in which the political activism of the black communities was on the rise, and re-estimate equation 1. Results shown in Table A.2 are qualitatively similar to the ones presented in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Second, I interact the *After* \times *Target* dummy with the share of black residents in the county in 1960, the estimated effect for both log number of votes and

²⁰ These states are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia

turnout is small and not statistically significant (Table 3, Column 3): political participation did not differentially increase in target counties with a larger share of black residents.

UNCONTESTED ELECTIONS. One additional concern has to do with changes in the number of uncontested elections in target counties as a result of the increasing number of Republican contestants in Southern states. Historically, the majority of the South used to vote Democratic; with the weakening of the *Solid South*, Republicans started contesting and winning in Southern states, such as Florida, Tennessee, and Virginia in 1952 and Louisiana and Kentucky in 1956 (Kuziemko & Washington, 2018; Phillips, 2014).²¹ A higher degree of political competition is expected to increase political participation and voter turnout (Konisky & Ueda, 2011). It would then be possible that the effect of the crisis on political participation simply captures the increasing number of republicans running in Southern electoral districts. Figure A.5 shows regression coefficients of equation 2 in which the dependent variable is a dummy equal one when Republicans run in a particular district and election. Relative to 1954, there is a reduction in 1958 and an increase in 1962 of republicans running in target counties; however, these coefficients are not statistically different from each other. This result also confirms historical accounts suggesting that the Republicans’ “Southern Strategy” to turn southern states into a Republican bastion started in 1964 and was perfected over the following decades (Maxwell & Shields, 2019). Similarly, there is no differential increase in the probability of having a Democratic contestant in target counties.

DIFFERENCE-IN-DISCONTINUITY DESIGN. Finally, in order to corroborate the validity of the results presented in Table 2, I employ an alternative empirical strategy that compares electoral outcomes in counties just outside and within the missile range over time. Specifi-

²¹ The term Solid South refers to the almost total control of presidential elections and House seats in the South by the Democratic party. In 1948 Southern conservative white politicians, historically belonging to the Democratic party, founded a new movement called States’ Rights Democratic Party (*Dixiecrats*) in order to maintain racial segregation. In 1948 the Dixiecrats did not support the Democratic nominee and chose Strom Thurmond as their presidential candidate instead; since then, their members had been aligned to the Republican party (Frederickson, 2001).

cally, I combine a regression discontinuity design with the difference-in-differences, exploiting the geographical variation induced by the missile range and the longitudinal feature of the data. I thus estimate the following equation:

$$y_{it} = \sum_{t=1958}^{1962} \alpha_{0t} d_i^k + \sum_{t=1958}^{1962} \alpha_{1t} T_i \times d_i^k + \sum_{t=1958}^{1962} \beta_t T_i + \delta'_{4t} X_{i,1950} + \lambda_t + \eta_i + u_{it} \quad (3)$$

where y_{it} is the electoral outcome in county i and election year t ; d_i is the distance of county i to the 1000 nautical mile range; T_i is a dummy equal to one for counties within the missile range, and k is the order of the polynomial regression. The specification controls for the interaction between the running variable and year dummies as well as its interaction with the treatment dummy, i.e. α_{0t} and α_{1t} . The parameter of interest is β_t , which estimates the year-specific treatment effect. The empirical model further includes county and year fixed effects, as well as the same baseline characteristics of the county as in equation 1 interacted with year dummies.

I estimate equation 3 using counties whose absolute distance from the missile range is from 100 to 175 miles.²² I exclude counties within 100 miles from the border, as in a “donut” regression discontinuity design, to avoid fuzziness in the treatment due to imprecise map representation of the target areas. More importantly, this sample exclusion is motivated by the fact that a nuclear blast would have directly affected areas within a 100-mile distance (George, 2004). Table 4 reports four sets of RDD estimates. In the first two regressions, the running variable is expressed as a first degree spline polynomial, while in the last two regressions it is expressed as a second degree spline polynomial.²³ Regression results show even a larger effect of being under the threat of Soviet missiles on political participation: target counties experienced a 12 percentage point increase in voter turnout with respect to 1958 midterm election. Changing the order degree of the spline polynomial does not affect

²² Figure A.6 provides a map of control and treated counties.

²³ In this empirical exercise, I cluster standard errors at the county level since the number of states within the bandwidth is low (i.e. 15).

the estimated coefficients.²⁴

The validity of this empirical design rests on the assumptions of parallel trends at the border. Note that, with the inclusion of county fixed effects, this strategy does not require balance in levels for a number observable characteristics. For this reason I focus on studying studying pre-trends of political participation. Figure 5 plots year-specific treatment effect from a regression of equation 3 on elections that go from 1954 to 1978. The figure provides no evidence of diverging pre-trends between treatment and control counties at the border. Interestingly, this specification does not deliver any meaningful persistent effect of the crisis on political participation for elections after 1962.

5.3 MECHANISMS

VOTE SHARES FOR THE DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS. To disentangle among potential mechanisms behind the increased political participation in 1962, I analyze the extent to which vote shares for both the Republican and Democratic party changed between 1962 and 1958 in target and non-target counties.

Table 5 shows difference-in-differences results where the dependent variable is the share of votes for the Democrats as a fraction of eligible voters (Panel A) in order to clean the estimates from any effect due to changes in voter turnout. Regression results indicate that the Democrats experienced an increase of about 4.7 percentage points in target counties between 1958 and 1992 elections. Including baseline county characteristics and year fixed effects reduces the size of the coefficients, which still remain positive and statistically significant; these findings indicate that the change in the support for the Democratic candidates in target counties increased by about 3 percentage points, which accounts for about 60% of the voter turnout increase. The interaction between the After dummy and the log distance to Cuba in Column (4) shows that doubling the distance from Cuba leads to a 3.5 percentage

²⁴ Reducing the bandwidth to counties from 100 to 150 leaves the estimates unaffected but it increases standard errors; these results are reported in Table A.3 of the Appendix.

point decrease in the support for the Democrats. I find no statistically significant effect on Republicans' vote shares. While there is a negative effect on their vote share, Column (1), accounting for county characteristics and year fixed effects makes the estimated coefficient turn positive but still non statistically significant.²⁵.

These results seem to be consistent with retrospective voting (Healy & Malhotra, 2013): the Cuban Missile Crisis suddenly increased the salience of a military threat, which was eventually resolved a few days before the election date. The peaceful resolution of the crisis should benefit the party of the leader in charge, i.e. Democrats. More importantly, one should expect the support for the leader's party to be larger in counties where the threat was more salient, i.e. counties exposed to the rocket fire. However, these results are also in line with other concurring explanations, such as issue valence, tightness of social norms, and rally-around the flag effects (Mueller, 1970; Winkler, 2021; Wright, 2012).

RALLY AROUND THE FLAG. The increased support for the Democratic party in target counties may potentially arise from a rally-round-the-flag effect generated by the crisis; when confronted by an external enemy, the public tends to rally to their leader, e.g. the President of the United States, who then enjoys a greater public support (Mueller, 1970, 1973).²⁶ While the president experienced an increase in popular support in the days of the crisis, as shown in Figure 1, it is less clear if this sentiment caused the increase in participation. The political science literature has long investigated rally effects, ultimately showing they are relatively ephemeral and short-lived (Brody & Shapiro, 1991). Baum (2002) argues that the President's party should experience a larger rally effect among voters of the opposition party than among its-own supporters; I thus perform the suggested test by running an heterogeneity analysis based on voting outcomes of the county before 1962. In particular, I

²⁵ As for political participation, I find no evidence of diverging pre-trends in both outcome variables (Figure A.7. I obtain similar results when employing the Panel RDD model (i.e. equation 3) on these two electoral outcomes; results are shown in Figure A.8 in the Appendix

²⁶ According to Mueller (1970), in order for a rally around the flag effect to arise, three conditions have to be met: (i) the event should international, (ii) involving the nation and directly its President, and (iii) it has to be "specific, dramatic and sharply focused".

interact the term $\text{After} \times \text{Target}$ with the vote share for the Republican party in the previous election (1960) to test if the support for the Democrats differentially increases in counties with a larger support for the Republicans. Results are reported in Table 6 and provide a small and not statistically significant coefficient. In addition, I estimate if the support for the Democrats increases depending on the party of the incumbent congressperson. I find no differential effect if the the county belongs to a district that elected a republican or a democratic candidate in 1960.

TIGHTNESS OF SOCIAL NORMS. A growing literature in social-psychology has shown that exposure to adverse events, such as conflicts or natural disasters, affects how tightly individuals hold to social norms; Winkler (2021) finds that when a disaster hits, individuals respond by holding more tightly to the norms and punishing others who do not. It may be that the crisis led voters of target counties to conform to the prevailing norms, including voting behavior and party preferences. For instance, indecisive voters living in a Democratic stronghold may have responded to the crisis by holding more tightly to the prevailing norms and thus voting for the Democrats. However, regression results do not support this interpretation: Column (5) of Table 6 shows no differential effect of the support for the Democrats in Democratic-majority counties.

ISSUE VALENCE. Findings in Table 5 may also be consistent with a valence advantage of the Democrats over security issues: parties gain political support when the issues they have a valence advantage over become salient (Getmansky & Zeitzoff, 2014; Wright, 2012). In order to address this point, I employ nationally representative survey data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) (Bordalo *et al.*, 2020). The ANES is a survey on public opinion and political participation, which asks questions on respondents demographic and social characteristics, as well as beliefs about political attitudes on a range of political issues. To test if Democrats had a valence advantage over issues that were made salient by the Cuban Missile Crisis, I use the ANES of 1960 in which respondents were asked which

party was better at handling specific issues such as foreign policy and racial rights, among the others.²⁷ Specifically, the survey first asked respondents whether they agree or not over a particular issue; it then asked which party they consider as better at handling that issue.

Figure A.9 plots the distribution of responses of all respondents and of those who agree and do not agree to the statement. I first investigate the distribution of responses over the question “*Which party do you think is more likely to keep soldiers overseas to help against communism, the democrats, or the republicans, or wouldn’t there be any difference between them on this*”, ultimately distinguishing between respondents who previously agreed or disagreed on the related sentence “*The United States should keep soldiers overseas where they can help countries that are against communism*”. While the majority of respondents agree with that sentence (80%), most of them think there is no difference between these two parties over the issue of fight on communism. Similarly, another set of questions regarding the U.S. foreign policy, asks “*This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern ourselves with problems in other parts of the world*”; followed by the question on which party is better on doing this. Once again, we find that the majority is against American isolationism and most of them respond there is no difference between Democrats or Republicans in handling this issue. I finally show that Democrats and Republicans have a valence advantage over employment related issues and state intervention in the economy, respectively.²⁸ While it is clear that these parties owned some specific domestic issues, their foreign policy positions were not perceived as different by American voters in 1960.

It is still possible that some congresspeople, instead of a particular party, had a valence advantage over national security issues that were made more salient by the crisis. While I do not have data about voters’ perceptions on the candidates running for a seat in their district,

²⁷ I do not use ANES of 1962 as only post-election survey is available, therefore outcomes may be influenced by the treatment. The full data documentation can be found here: <https://electionstudies.org/data-center/>.

²⁸ The precise questions asked in the survey are: “which party do you think is more likely to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job, the democrats or the republicans, or wouldn’t there be any difference between them on this”; “which party do you think is more likely to leave things to private business to handle; the democrats or the republicans, or wouldn’t there be much difference between them on this”.

I do have information on representatives' voting records during their mandate. I thus employ data from the 87th United States Congressional roll call voting records, which provide information on House members' voting action on every roll call vote taken over January 1961 and January 1963, along with their name, political party, and congressional district (ICPSR, 2010). These data allow me to identify representatives' vote on resolutions against Cuba and Fidel Castro.²⁹ I thus create a dummy indicating whether the congressperson voted in favor of a more firm resolution towards Cuba and I interact it with the treatment. Results show that there is no additional effect on the support for the Democrats in target counties in 1962 if the incumbent democratic congressperson voted for more strict actions against Cuba in the last congress.

RETROSPECTIVE VOTING. These estimates indicate that issue valence was not the main driver of the estimated effects; at the same time, the last set of results is still consistent with retrospective voting. Voters may rely on cognitive short-cuts when making voting decisions: instead of assessing the full set of information, they use the most easily available attribute (Healy & Lenz, 2014). Excessive weighting of recent events, such as President Kennedy's management and peaceful resolution of the crisis, may have pushed voters to disregard past performance of the incumbent congressperson and to vote for the President's party (Bordalo *et al.*, 2013). The analysis of historical ANES presented in Table 7 seems to support this interpretation. By comparing post-electoral survey of 1958 and 1962 and respondents living in counties within or outside the missile range, I find that "target" respondents were more likely to vote for a particular candidate for congress because of his/her party affiliation rather than past performance, personal characteristics, or stand on domestic issues, such as racial segregation and social welfare. While party affiliation was the main reason for voting for a particular candidate for congress, this was not driven by increased partisanship of target voters in 1962: with respect to non-target voters, respondents in target areas are

²⁹ These resolutions are: H.J. Res. 226 (May 17, 1961) and S.J. Res. 230 (Sept. 26, 1962) (US Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1971).

not significantly more likely to report they knew all along what to vote for and that they always vote for the same party.

5.4 EFFECTS ON POLICY OUTCOMES

ROLL CALL VOTES. A question still unanswered is whether the Cuban Missile Crisis affected policy outcomes. Threats are believed to motivate protective behaviors and promotes support for protective government policies (Huddy *et al.*, 2007). I address this issue by investigating the extent to which the threat of the missiles influenced how representatives from target districts voted on bills, resolutions, nominations, and treaties related to national defense and foreign policy. For this empirical investigation, I use House of Representatives roll call voting records from 87th (January 3, 1961 - January 3, 1963) and 88th (January 3, 1963 - January 3, 1965) Congresses (ICPSR, 2010). I supplement these data with information available on the online platform *voteview.com* (Lewis *et al.*, 2021), which provides the subject each roll call vote, and select votes classified as Defense Budget, Foreign Policy Budget, and Foreign Policy Resolutions.³⁰ The final dataset includes the vote of each representative on every roll call votes, as well as representatives' electoral district and state, political party, type of seat occupancy, and their unique identifier.

In order to estimate the effects of the crisis on policy outcomes, I manually classified which vote, i.e. *Yea* or *Nay*, supported the approval of military and foreign policy spending. I thus estimated if representatives' voting behavior on these subjects changed in electoral districts within the range of the missiles after the crisis took place. The longitudinal feature of the data allows me to estimate a similar version of equation 1 in which the outcome y_{idv} is the vote of representative i of district d on roll call v . $Target_d$ is a dummy equal to one if the district lies within the range of the missiles and $After_v$ is equal to one for all roll calls that took place after October 22, 1962. The specification further allows the inclusion of representative fixed effects, thus comparing the same elected congresspeople before and

³⁰ The list of these votes is provided in Table A.5 in the Appendix.

after the crisis.

Column (1) of Table 8 reports estimated effects on the probability of voting in favor of military spending. The effect is positive and statistically significant; adding representative fixed effects (Column 2) mitigates concerns about changes in the composition of elected members in target districts following the crisis and only marginally affects the estimated coefficients: after the crisis, congresspeople from target districts were 10 percentage point more likely to support military spending than the ones from non-target districts. Columns (3) and (4) look at the probability of voting in favor of foreign-policy (non-military) spending, the effects are sizeable, statistically significant and similar to the ones estimated for military spending.³¹

I then turn to the analysis of representatives' voting in favor of resolutions promoting a more aggressive policy towards the Soviet Union, Cuba and Communist countries; these include the Cuban and Berlin resolutions of 1962, and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 (US Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1971). This last resolution is particularly important as it authorized the President to take any measures, including the use of conventional military force, to maintain peace and security in southeast Asia. This piece of legislation helped the Johnson administration to begin the U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. All the estimates effects are positive, economically meaningful and statistically significant; Column (6) shows that representatives from target districts increased the probability of voting in favor of more aggressive foreign policy after the crisis by 15 percentage points (i.e. 21% increase).

Taken together, these findings indicate that the occurrence of the crisis changed voting behavior of target districts' representatives ultimately favoring foreign-policy and military spending. The last two columns of Table 8 further suggest that representatives from target areas were more likely to support foreign interventions after 1962, including military action in Southeast Asia.

³¹ Foreign policy (non-military) spending includes the authorizations of foreign aid and economic cooperation.

VIETNAM-ERA MILITARY SERVICE. As external threats are believed to strengthen group identity, patriotism, and cooperation (Gehring, 2020; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), I finally address the question of whether the Cuban Missile Crisis affected the willingness of Americans from target counties to defend the nation by serving in the military. In particular, the military nature of the Soviet threat, may have pushed the affected population to enlist in the army to fight communism abroad. To this end, I employ NHGIS data on the share of veterans by period of service among civilian males 16 years and over in 1970 in each US county (Manson *et al.*, 2017). As this information is purely cross-sectional, I can only exploit the discontinuity induced by the range of the missiles that I already employed in equation 3. I thus compare the share of veterans that served in Vietnam in counties whose absolute distance from the missile range is from 100 to 175 miles. Table 9 reports three sets of RDD estimates. In the first two regressions, the running variable is expressed as a first degree spline polynomial (with and without county characteristics in 1970), while in the last column it is expressed as a second degree spline polynomial.

Regression results show that the share of Vietnam veterans is almost 6 percentage point larger in counties barely within the missiles' range (Column (1) - Panel A). These results are robust to the inclusion of county characteristics in 1970 and to a different degree of the spline polynomial (Column 3). The data further provide information on the ethnicity of the veterans, I thus compute the share of white and black Vietnam veterans and estimate if they discontinuously change at the cutoff. Regression results in Panels B and C show that the increased probability of serving in Vietnam only comes from white Americans.

To corroborate the validity of these findings, I first run a placebo regression that uses as a dependent variable the share of veterans from the Korean war. As this war took place before the Cuban Missile Crisis (i.e. 1950-1953), I would not expect to see any discontinuity at the cutoff; reassuringly, the estimated effects are small and statistically insignificant. I further provide evidence of balancing of county characteristics in 1970 at the threshold (Table A.4 in the Appendix).

6 CONCLUSION

This paper exploits the Cuban Missile Crisis as a natural experiment that exogenously changed the perception of a military threat among American voters. I find two key results on electoral outcomes. First, counties lying within the missile range experienced an increase in political participation; this effect further increases with the probability of being a target, i.e. counties in which urban areas or military bases were located. Second, the increase in voter turnout benefited the President's party: despite usual and expected midterm losses, the Democratic party's vote share increased by 3 percentage points in 1962 in target counties.

Historical surveys shed lights on the mechanisms at play. Respondents living in within the missile range reported raising fear and concerns over Cuba in the days following President Kennedy's address to the nation. They also reported that the most important reason why they voted for a particular candidate was his/her own party's affiliation, independently of the past performance. Overall, these findings are consistent with psychologically based theories of retrospective voting (Healy & Malhotra, 2013): voters living within the missile range, thus having the largest gain from a peaceful resolution of the crisis, responded the most by turning out at the polls in 1962 elections and supporting the President's party. The crisis did not have persistent effects on electoral outcomes, but it had meaningful policy consequences as it increased the support of representatives towards military spending and foreign intervention, including military intervention in Southeast Asia.

This is, to the best of my knowledge, one of the first studies that uses non-experimental and non-survey data to examine the extent to which threats to the nation prompt retrospective voting, ultimately affecting electoral and policy outcomes.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1: Descriptives

	All (1)	Target (2)	Non-Target (3)
Panel A: Census 1950			
Number	2,924	1,107	1,817
Population	49,875.36	34,319.9	59,352.52
Density	208.96	141.49	250.30
% Age 0-5	11.43	12.07	11.04
% Black	11.81	23.43	3.11
Infant Mortality	0.03	0.04	0.03
Median Years of School	8.78	7.76	9.47
High School Enrollment	69.05	69.95	68.44
LF to Population	36.07	33.98	37.57
Median Family Income	2,300.23	1,704.07	2,705.19
Panel B: Electoral Outcomes 1958			
Voter Turnout	36.6	19.95	48.47
% Democratic Party	19.8	14.75	23.42
% Republican Party	15.7	5.00	23.33
% Other Party	1.10	0.02	0.17

Note. The table reports descriptive statistics of U.S. counties in the sample dividing by target and non-target counties. Target counties are those located within 1,000 nautical miles from the San Cristobal MRBM Launch site in Cuba (22°38'35.3"N 83°21'59.5"W). Panel A reports county characteristics based on 1950 U.S. Population Census. Panel B shows main electoral outcomes in 1958 midterm election. Vote shares are expressed as a proportion of eligible voters.

Table 2: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation

	1958-1962			1954-1978		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Log Votes						
After	0.0757*					
	(0.0406)					
Target	-1.2857***	-0.6707***				
	(0.2755)	(0.1382)				
After × Target	0.3550***	0.3043***	0.3052***		0.4393***	
	(0.0868)	(0.0667)	(0.0670)		(0.0906)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.5081***		-0.5534***
				(0.1278)		(0.1022)
Panel B: Turnout						
After	0.0226*					
	(0.0120)					
Target	-0.3328***	-0.2091***				
	(0.0368)	(0.0397)				
After × Target	0.0436***	0.0500***	0.0504***		0.0649***	
	(0.0128)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)		(0.0188)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.0772***		-0.0813***
				(0.0250)		(0.0241)
Controls:						
$X_{i,1950} \times \text{Year}$	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
County FE	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	5,848	5,846	5,846	5,846	20,076	20,076

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Panel A reports estimates of equation 1 where the dependent variable is the log of total votes in 1958-1962 (Columns 1-4) and 1954-1978 United States House of Representatives midterm elections (Columns 5-6). In Panel B the dependent variable is voter turnout, i.e. total votes divided by the (log-interpolated) voting-age population based on US Population Census data.

Table 3: Heterogeneous effects

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Log Votes			
After × Target	0.2943*** (0.0693)	0.2803*** (0.0666)	0.2015* (0.1064)
After × Top100 City	-0.0879 (0.0697)		
After × Target × Top100 City	0.2460** (0.1030)		
After × Military Base		-0.0101 (0.0326)	
After × Target × Military Base		0.2129*** (0.0713)	
After × % Black 1960			0.0122 (0.0355)
After × Target × % Black 1960			0.0568 (0.0475)
Panel B: Turnout			
After × Target	0.0452*** (0.0147)	0.0446*** (0.0144)	0.0460* (0.0267)
After × Top100 City	0.0069 (0.0120)		
After × Target × Top100 City	0.0478** (0.0207)		
After × Military Base		-0.0099 (0.0072)	
After × Target × Military Base		0.0197* (0.0109)	
After × % Black 1960			0.0034 (0.0085)
After × Target × % Black 1960			0.0016 (0.0108)
Observations	5,846	5,846	5,846

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. The sample consists of 1958 and 1962 midterm elections. All regressions include baseline county characteristics interacted with time dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2 Column (3).

Table 4: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation - Panel RDD

	$k = 1$		$k = 2$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Log Votes				
After \times Target	0.6297*** (0.2291)	0.6296*** (0.2288)	0.6334** (0.2538)	0.6334** (0.2529)
Panel B: Turnout				
After \times Target	0.1166* (0.0706)	0.1166* (0.0705)	0.1199* (0.0696)	0.1199* (0.0693)
Controls:				
$X_{1950} \times$ Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	702	702	702	702

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. The table reports estimates of coefficient β_t of equation 3 on log votes and turnout. The sample consists of 1958-1962 midterm elections and counties located from 100 to 175 miles from the missiles' range.

Table 5: The Cuban Missile Crisis and electoral results

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: vote shares for the Democrats				
After	-0.0173** (0.0077)			
Target	-0.1031*** (0.0234)	-0.0449** (0.0216)		
After × Target	0.0473*** (0.0112)	0.0312*** (0.0083)	0.0303*** (0.0083)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.0355** (0.0165)
Panel B: vote shares for the Democrats				
After	0.0434*** (0.0082)			
Target	-0.2125*** (0.0195)	-0.1463*** (0.0238)		
After × Target	-0.0086 (0.0093)	0.0138 (0.0108)	0.0150 (0.0110)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.0244 (0.0161)
Controls:				
$X_{i,1950} \times \text{Year}$	N	Y	Y	Y
County FE	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	5,848	5,846	5,846	5,846

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Panel A reports estimates of equation 1 where the dependent variable is the vote share for the Democratic party in 1958-1962 United States House of Representatives midterm elections. In Panel B the dependent variable is the corresponding vote share for the Republican party.

Table 6: Heterogeneous effects on the support for the Democratic party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
After × Target × Rep 1960 (%)	0.0019 (0.0407)				
After × Target × Rep Distr.1960		-0.0077 (0.0190)			
After × Target × Dem Distr.1960			0.0077 (0.0193)	-0.0165 (0.0219)	
After × Target × Dem Distr.1960 × Sanctions				0.0356 (0.0255)	
After × Target × Majority Dem 1960					-0.0412 (0.0309)
Observations	5,846	5,846	5,846	5,686	5,846

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. The dependent variable is the vote share for the Democratic party in 1958-1962 United States House of Representatives midterm elections. All regressions include baseline county characteristics interacted with time dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2 Column (3).

Table 7: Reasons to vote for a particular candidate - ANES 1958-1962

	Past Performance (1)	Personal Characteristics (2)	Handle Domestic Issues (3)	Always Same Party (4)	Party Identification (5)
After	0.0053 (0.0192)	0.0174 (0.0154)	-0.0066 (0.0086)	-0.0217 (0.0365)	-0.0519* (0.0308)
After × Target	0.0108 (0.0251)	0.0094 (0.0221)	-0.0084 (0.0150)	0.0102 (0.0478)	0.0840** (0.0378)
Controls:					
County FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Id Characteristics	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	2,599	2,599	2,599	2,599	2,599

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. The sample consists of respondents from 1958 and 1962 ANES post electoral surveys. All regressions include county fixed effects and the following respondents' characteristics: age, gender, ethnicity, education, and income. The specific question asked in the surveys is: "What would you say is the most important reason you voted for the congressional candidate?". Among potential answers, I analysed "Has done a good job" (Column 1), "Candidate is a good man" (Column 2), "Stand on domestic issues, such as farm, segregation, health, and labor" (Column 3), "Always voted for the same party" (Column 4), "Party identification, he was a dem (or rep)" (Column 5)

Table 8: Roll call votes

	Military Spending		Foreign Spending		Foreign Interventions	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
After × Target	0.1278*** (0.0245)	0.1030*** (0.0207)	0.1246*** (0.0419)	0.1165*** (0.0418)	0.1621*** (0.0399)	0.1475*** (0.0401)
Controls:						
Representatives FE	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	13,285	13,285	12,864	12,864	5,214	5,214


Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. All regressions include state and vote fixed effects; Columns (2), (4), (6) also includes House representative fixed effects.

Table 9: Veteran status in 1970

	$k = 1$		$k = 2$
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Vietnam veterans			
Target	0.0597** (0.0284)	0.0403*** (0.0146)	0.1556* (0.0801)
Panel B: Vietnam veterans (white)			
Target	0.0556** (0.0278)	0.0370** (0.0143)	0.1542** (0.0782)
Panel C: Vietnam veterans (black)			
Target	0.0037 (0.0037)	0.0026 (0.0018)	0.0007 (0.0133)
Panel D: Korea veterans			
Target	0.0042 (0.0094)	-0.0044 (0.0063)	-0.0031 (0.0372)
Controls:			
X_{1970}	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	442	415	415


Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. The sample consists of counties located from 100 to 175 miles from the missile range. County characteristics in 1970 (X_{1970}) include (log) population, (log) density, (log) median family income, (log) labor force participation rate, and the share of black residents. All dependent variables are share of veterans over the male population 16 years and over. All regressions are weighted by male population 16 years and over

Figure 1: Presidential approval ratings - J. F. Kennedy



Note. The figure plots monthly approval ratings of the Presidency over the period 1961-1963. Source: Gallup data.


Figure 2: Range of the missiles and most populated U.S. cities in 1960




Note. The figure plots US counties and the location of the most populated cities in 1960. Each county is colored according to the distance from its centroid to the San Cristobal MRBM Launch site (22°38'35.3"N 83°21'59.5"W).

Figure 3: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the US public opinion


(a) Cuba




(b) Farm/Farm Prices



(c) Unemployment




(d) Segregation




Note. These figures plot estimates of the interaction between the share of the target population in each U.S. state and monthly date dummies on the probability of responding (a) “Cuba” (b) “Farm/Farm prices” (c) “Unemployment” (d) “Racial Problems/Segregation” to the question “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?”. Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 4: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation - Event study

(a) Log Votes




(b) Turnout




Note. The figures plot estimates of coefficient γ_t of equation 3 on log votes and turnout. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1954-1978 midterm elections. The specification includes baseline county characteristics interacted with year dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2, Column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure 5: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation - Panel RDD

(a) Log Votes



(b) Turnout



Note. The figures plot estimates of coefficient β_t of equation 3 on log votes and turnout. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1954-1978 midterm elections and counties located from 100 to 175 miles from the missile range. The specification is the same as Table 4, Column (2). Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

A APPENDIX

Table A.1: The Cuban Missile Crisis and the US public opinion

	Problem - Cuba		Worried	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
After	0.1664*** (0.0109)			
Target (%)	-0.0114 (0.0152)		0.0833* (0.0466)	0.1137*** (0.0405)
After × Target (%)	0.0834** (0.0388)	0.0731** (0.0356)		
Controls:				
Respondents' Characteristics	N	Y	N	Y
Month FE	N	Y	N	N
State FE	N	Y	N	N
Observations	22,415	22,401	4,413	4,405

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. In Columns 1 and 2 the dependent variable is a dummy equal one when interviewed people respond “Cuba” to the question “*What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?*”. In Columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is a dummy equal one when respondents answer “*a great deal*” to the question “*In recent days, how much would you say you have worried about the problems facing this country?*”. Respondents’ characteristics include age, gender, ethnic group, education, income group and city size.

Table A.2: Effects on political participation - excluding literacy-test states

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Log Votes				
After	0.0754* (0.0410)			
Target	-0.8070*** (0.1759)	-0.5488*** (0.1467)		
After × Target	0.2802*** (0.0822)	0.2548*** (0.0773)	0.2536*** (0.0774)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.3745*** (0.1196)
Panel B: Turnout				
After	0.0226* (0.0121)			
Target	-0.2426*** (0.0536)	-0.1715*** (0.0507)		
After × Target	0.0539*** (0.0152)	0.0449** (0.0176)	0.0455** (0.0176)	
After × Distance from Cuba (log)				-0.0667** (0.0293)
Controls:				
$X_{i,1950} \times \text{Year}$	N	Y	Y	Y
County FE	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	4,574	4,572	4,572	4,572

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. The sample consists of 1958 and 1962 midterm elections. I removed from the sample all the seven southern states that ever adopted literacy tests for voter registration. All regressions include baseline county characteristics interacted with time dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2 Column (3).

Table A.3: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation - Panel RDD (50-mile bandwidth)

	$k = 1$		$k = 2$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Panel A: Log Votes				
After \times Target	0.7290*	0.7289*	0.6895*	0.6890*
	(0.3770)	(0.3750)	(0.3971)	(0.3943)
Panel B: Turnout				
After \times Target	0.1557	0.1557	0.1428	0.1427
	(0.1136)	(0.1131)	(0.1110)	(0.1103)
Controls:				
$X_{1950} \times \text{Year}$	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	472	472	472	472


Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. The table reports estimates of coefficient β_t of equation 3 on log votes and turnout. The sample consists of 1958-1962 midterm elections and counties located from 100 to 150 miles from the missiles' range.

Table A.4: Balancing of county characteristics in 1970

	$k = 1$	$k = 2$
	(1)	(2)
Log population	-0.2209	1.9586
	(0.7381)	(5.1777)
Log density	0.4699	6.3730
	(0.9001)	(6.3476)
Log family income	-0.1182	-0.1400
	(0.1382)	(0.9498)
Log LFPR	-0.1227	0.1897
	(0.1157)	(0.9009)
Share of black	2.7361	12.9323
	(6.7780)	(47.7571)
Observations	418	418

Note. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the county level. The sample consists of counties located from 100 to 175 miles from the missile range.


Figure A.1: Map of the missile site in Cuba



Source: National Security Archive.

Figure A.2: Media coverage of the Cuban Missile Crisis

(a) New York Times



(b) The Miami News




(c) The Los Angeles Times



(d) The St. Louis Dispatch



(e) The Philadelphia Inquirer



(f) The Charlotte Observer



Note. The figure shows a selection of newspaper articles reporting the range of the missiles on October 23, 1962. Sources: newspapers.com, timesmachine.nytimes.com.

Figure A.3: Media coverage of the Cuban Missile Crisis - Local newspapers

(a) The Akron Beacon Journal (Ohio)

Akron In Peril Area

Akron is just within range of the offensive missiles which Cuba has in place, capable of firing, according to President Kennedy's speech Monday night and briefings by Pentagon officials later.

Already operational in Cuba, the President said, are mobile medium-range ballistic missiles with a range of about 1,000 nautical miles (1,150 land miles.)

Akron is approximately 1,100 land miles from Havana, on the northern coast of Cuba.

(b) The Sedalia Democrat (Missouri)




(c) Fort Worth Star-Telegram (Texas)



Note. The figure shows a selection of local newspaper articles reporting the range of the missiles on October 23, 1962 and indicating if their county of origin is within this range. Sources: newspapers.com.


Figure A.4: The Cuban Missile Crisis and political participation in presidential elections-Event study




Note. The figures plot estimates of coefficient γ_t of equation 3 on log votes and turnout. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1952-1976 presidential elections. The specification includes baseline county characteristics interacted with year dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2, Column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.5: The Cuban Missile Crisis and uncontested (midterm) elections

(a) Republican contestant




(b) Democratic contestant



Note. These figures plot estimated effects of the interaction between the Target dummy and year dummies on the probability of observing: (a) a Republican contestant (b) a Democratic contestant in each county's electoral district and election. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1954, 1958, 1962, and 1966 midterm elections. The specification includes baseline county characteristics interacted with year dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2 and 5 Column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.


Figure A.6: Regression discontinuity design - map of treated and control counties




Note. The figure plots treated, donut, and control US counties analyzed in Table 4. Donut counties are those within 100 miles on either side of the threshold delimiting the 1000 nautical mile range from Cuba.

Figure A.7: The Cuban Missile Crisis and electoral results - Event study

(a) Democrats (%)




(b) Republicans (%)




Note. The figures plot estimates of coefficient γ_t of equation 3 on the vote shares for the Democratic and Republican party. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1954-1978 midterm elections. The specification includes baseline county characteristics interacted with year dummies, county and year fixed effects, i.e. same specification used in Table 2, Column (3). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.

Figure A.8: The Cuban Missile Crisis and electoral results - Panel RDD

(a) Democrats (%)




(b) Republicans (%)




Note. The figures plots estimates of coefficient β_t of equation 3 on vote shares for the Democratic and Republican party. Midterm election in 1954 has been set as the comparison category. The sample consists of 1954-1978 midterm elections and counties located from 100 to 175 miles from the missile range. The specification is the same as Table 4, Column (2). Standard errors are clustered at the county level.

Figure A.9: Issue Valence - ANES 1960


(a) Fight on Communism




(b) Isolationism



(c) Employment guarantee



(d) Free Market



Note. The data come from the American National Election Study of 1960. See Section 5.3 for a detailed description of the questions asked.

Table A.5: Classification of roll call votes

Vote	Support
Military Spending	
S. 1852. Authorize appropriations to procure aircraft, missiles and ships in fiscal 1962. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 7712. Fourth supplemental appropriations bill for fiscal 1961. Funds for departments of state, justice, treasury, and defense including state department funds committed to pay u.s. assessment for u.n. action in congo. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 8302. Fiscal 1962 appropriations for military construction in u.s. and abroad. Passed.	Yea
S. 2311. Authorize additional appropriations for aircraft, missiles and ships to meet possible crisis in berlin or elsewhere. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 7851. Defense appropriations bill for fiscal 1962. Conference report. Adopted.	Yea
H.r. 8773. Increase readjustment payments to armed forces reserve personnel involuntarily released from active duty. Passed.	Yea
H.r. 9751. Authorize appropriation for aircraft missile and naval vessel procurement.	Yea
H.r. 10743. Raise compensation payments to veterans with service-connected disabilities by \$98 million.	Yea
H.r. 11038. Second supplemental appropriation bill. Gross (r iowa) motion to recommit with instructions to limit u.s. contribution to u.n. congo costs.	Nay
H.r. 11289. Appropriate \$47.8 billion to defense dept.	Yea
H.r. 11500. Extend the defense production act of 1950 for two years, to june 30 1964.	Yea
S. 2775. Funds for trust territory of the pacific islands, authorize additional appropriation for administration.	Yea
H.r. 2440. Authorize \$15856 ,391,000 for military procurement, research and development of aircraft, missiles and ships. Committee amendment adding \$363,700,000 to the president's request for air force research and development to be used for rs-70 plans.	Yea
H.r. 2440. Curtis motion to recommit with instructions to reduce authorization for all items except air force research and development and navy ship and torpedo procurement by 5H.r. 2440. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 7179. Appropriations for the department of defense. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 5555. Authorize \$1.2 billion annually for pay increases for the armed services, coast guard. Adoption of conference report.	Yea
H. Res. 539. Open rule for debate on h.r. 7044, authorizing the appropriation of \$1.5 million to restore corregidor island in manila bay as a site memorializing filipino and american servicemen of w.w.ii.	Yea
H.r. 7179. Defense department appropriations. Adoption of conference report.	Yea
H.r. 6500. Conference report authorizing \$1,642,254,380 for construction of military bases in the u.s. and abroad, and for military family housing.	Yea
H.r. 2988. Allow continued participation by u.s. armed forces personnel in international civilian and military sports competitions. Increase the appropriations. Passage under suspension of the rules.	Yea
H.r. 9139. Military construction appropriation bill. Passage.	Yea
S. 777. Authorize a 2-year \$20 million appropriation for the arms control and disarmament agency. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 9139. Military construction appropriations. Adoption of conference report.	Yea

H.r. 9637. Authorize appropriation of \$16,914,800,000 for procurement of aircraft missiles and ships for military services and for all defense research and development passage.	Yea
H.r. 10939. Authorize \$4675 9,567,000 for the defense department. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 11369. Appropriate \$15 99,014,500 for construction of military facilities and family housing. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 10939. Conference report appropriating \$46,752,051,000 for the defense department. Adopted (with one provision still in dispute between the house and senate—below).	Yea
H.r. 1927. Revise the disability and death pensions for veterans of w.w.i w.w.ii and the korean war. Teague motion to pass the bill under suspension of the rules.	Yea
S. 1627. Enable the u.s. to pay its share of fiscal 1964 operating expenses of the international commission for supervision and control in laos. Passage.	Yea
Foreign Policy Spending	
H.r. 6518. Appropriate \$500 million for inter-american social and economic cooperation program and \$100 million for chilean reconstruction and rehabilitation program. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 6765. Authorize u.s. acceptance of amendment to the charter of the international finance corporation to permit ifc to acquire capital stock in private companies in underdeveloped nations. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 8400. 1961 foreign aid authorization. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
S. 1983. Foreign assistance act of 1961. Authorize \$4 billion in foreign aid in fiscal 1962 and an additional \$1.5 billion for development loans in fiscal 1963-1966. Conference report adopted. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 9033. Foreign assistance appropriations act of 1961. Passman amendment as amended by ford, increasing military aid appropriations. Agreed to. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 9033. Foreign assistance appropriations act of 1961. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 9033. Foreign assistance appropriations act for fiscal 1962. Conference report. Agreed to. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 10162. Standby authority for u.s. to loan \$2 billion to the international monetary fund.	Yea
H.r. 11921. Foreign aid 196 2. New appropriations for fiscal 1963, including certain 4 year authorizations, and alliance for progress funds.	Yea
S. 2996. Foreign assistance act. Conference report agreed to.	Yea
H.r. 13175. Foreign aid appropriation act. Rhodes motion to recommit with instructions to reduce economic aid appropriations.	Nay
H.r. 13175. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 13175. Foreign aid appropriation act. Adoption of conference report.	Yea
H.r. 5517. Supplemental appropriations for fiscal 1963. Lipscomb motion to recommit conference report with instructions that house conferees disagree to a senate amendment providing \$65000 a s a u.s. contribution to the international peace corps secretariat.	Yea
H.r. 3872. Extend for five years the life of the exportimport bank and increase its lending authority. Patman (d-texas) motion insisting that the house conferees disagree to a senate amendment continuing "backdoor financing" for the agency.	Yea
H.r. 7885. Foreign assistance act of 1963. Amend foreign aid law and authorize appropriations of \$4,087,075,000 for foreign aid in fiscal 1964. Adair (r-ind.) Motion to recommit with instructions to reduce appropriations.	Nay

H.r. 7885. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 7885. Foreign assistance act of 1963. Adoption of conference report.	Yea
H.r. 9499. Foreign aid appropriations. Jensen (r-iowa) motion to recommit and insert an amendment designed to bar the export-import bank from guaranteeing credits to communist countries or their nationals for the purchase of u.s. commodities.	Yea
H.r. 9499. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 9499. Foreign aid appropriations. Adoption of the rule (h. Res. 598) waiving points of order on the conference report.	Yea
H.r. 9022. Authorize \$312 million as the u.s. contribution to an increase in the financial resources of the international development assn. Talcott motion to recommit.	Nay
S. 2455. Authorize \$115 million for peace corps operations in fiscal 1965. Gross motion to recommit to foreign affairs comm. With instructions to reduce the authorization to \$95,963,971.	Nay
S. 2349. Authorize up to \$44.9 million to implement the convention on the chamizal. Passage.	Yea
S. 2214. Authorize \$312 million as the u.s. contribution to an increase in the financial resources of the international development association. Clawson motion to recommit.	Nay
H.r. 11380. The foreign assistance act of 1964. Adair motion to recommit with instructions to reduce the fiscal 1965 authorization for development loans by \$750,000,000 and the president's contingency fund by \$50,000,000.	Nay
H.r. 11380. Passage.	Yea
H.r. 11812. Appropriate \$37 39,249,400 for foreign assistance and related agencies. Adoption of a resolution (h. Res. 793) waiving all points of order against this bill.	Yea
H.r. 11812. Rhodes motion to recommit to the appropriations comm. With instructions to reduce economic aid funds by \$247., million.	Nay
H.r. 11812. Passage.	Yea
Foreign Policy Resolutions	
H. Con. Res. 226. Favor collective sanctions by oas against castro government of cuba. Adopted.	Yea
S.j. res. 120. Give president authority to call up ready reserves and extend for 12 months tours of those currently on active duty with armed forces, to meet possible crisis in berlin or elsewhere. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
S. Con. Res. 34. Oppose admission red china to u.n. and u.s. recognition of red china. Adopted. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 9118. Establish a u.s. arms control agency. Passed. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
H.r. 9118. Establish a u.s. arms control and disarmament agency. Conference report. Agreed to. Yea supports president's position.	Yea
S.j. res. 224. Grant president standby authority until feb. 28, 1963, to call 15000 0 members of the ready reserve to active duty.	Yea
S.j. res. 230. Express u.s. determination to prevent the spread of communism from cuba to the rest of the western hemisphere by any means necessary. Broomfield motion to recommit with instructions to amend to include provision regarding implementation f the monroe doctrine.	Yea
S.j. res. 230. Passage.	Yea

H. Con. Res. 570. Resolution expressing the sense of congress that the u.s. is "determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms," any soviet violation of allied rights in berlin.	Yea
H.r. 9124. Revise the junior and senior reserve officers' training corps programs of the army, air force, and navy. Hebert (d-la.) Motion to suspend rules and pass. (2/3's req. - failed) 101-89.	Yea
H.j. res. 1145. Support the president's actions in retaliating to attacks against u.s. naval forces off viet nam and pledge u.s. assistance to any member or protocol state of the seato treaty which requests aid in defense of its freedom.	Yea
H. Con. Res. 343. Express the sense of congress that the u.s. continue efforts to secure payment of assessments in arrears by u.n. members and urge that financially delinquent members be subject to article 19 of the charter.	Yea

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