Another unconsidered sinister effect of industry-specific crises? On the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena on the survival of entrepreneurial ventures

S. Colombo  L.Grilli

IEF0098 – July- 2010
Another unconsidered sinister effect of industry-specific crises? On the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena on the survival of entrepreneurial ventures.

S. Colombo L. Grilli
98 - luglio 2010
Another unconsidered sinister effect of industry-specific crises? On the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena on the survival of entrepreneurial ventures

S. Colombo(*)  L. Grilli(●)

(*)Istituto di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Largo Gemelli 1 – 20123 Milano, e-mail: stefano.colombo@unicatt.it

(●)Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Politecnico di Milano, e-mail: luca.grilli@polimi.it
* Esemplare fuori commercio per il deposito legale agli effetti della Legge n. 106 del 15 aprile 2004.

* La Redazione ottempera agli obblighi previsti dalla Legge n. 106 del 15.04.2006, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica del 03.05.2006 n. 252 pubblicato nella G.U. del 18.08.2006 n. 191.

* I quaderni sono disponibili on-line all’indirizzo dell’Istituto http://www.unicatt.it/istituti/EconomiaFinanza

* I Quaderni dell’Istituto di Economia e Finanza costituiscono un servizio atto a fornire la tempestiva divulgazione di ricerche scientifiche originali, siano esse in forma definitiva o provvisoria. L’accesso alla collana è approvato dal Comitato Scientifico, sentito il parere di un referee.
Another unconsidered sinister effect of industry-specific crises? On the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena on the survival of entrepreneurial ventures

Stefano Colombo
Istituto di Economia e Finanza-Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano

Luca Grilli
Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering-Politecnico di Milano

Abstract.
This article explores the possibility that under an intensely negative industry-specific shock, the commonly detected positive relationship between the human capital of founders and the survival prospects of start-up businesses may actually be reversed. Starting from an analysis of the issue from a theoretical perspective in order to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of these adverse selection phenomena in entrepreneurship, the study examines a sample of 179 Italian start-ups operating in the ICT services market created during the boom period from 1995 to early 2000. Econometric analyses provide evidence that, during an intense industry crisis (i.e., early 2000 to 2003), entrepreneurs with a substantial amount of human capital may pursue an exit strategy.

JEL codes: L26; L86
Keywords: High-tech entrepreneurship; Adverse selection; Industry crises

Introduction
This article studies the relationship between the entrepreneurs’ human capital and the decision whether to continue to run the firm or choose an alternative employment option during an industry-specific crisis. The impact of entrepreneurs’ human capital is controversial. On one hand, more experienced and skilled entrepreneurs are likely to obtain higher profits than less experienced and skilled ones in the sector where the crisis occurs, and therefore, all else being equal, entrepreneurs with high human capital are less prompt to stop to run the firm during an industry crisis. On the other hand, the opportunity costs of high-profile human capital entrepreneurs of running the firm during the crisis may be high given the potential returns of their efforts in alternative employment opportunities, and this, all else being equal, makes entrepreneurs with high human capital more prompt to stop to run the firm and look for other employment opportunities. Therefore, it may be that during an industry-specific crisis relatively high-skilled entrepreneurs stop to run the firm, while entrepreneurs with a low human capital profile continue operations, just because the former have more attractive alternative options, while the latter are locked in their venture because of lacking of alternative opportunities. The possible emergence of this adverse selection phenomenon in entrepreneurship was firstly suggested by Gimeno et al. (1997, p.756), which argue: “there may
be situations in which entrepreneurs do not continue their business even though, in terms of economic performance, they are better off than other entrepreneurs. They may take this action because of the opportunity costs associated with staying in business – their level of education and training may warrant more attractive economic returns in alternative employment opportunities. Similarly, a poorly performing venture may continue because of the entrepreneur’s lack of other attractive options, strong physical attachment to the new venture, or high costs associated with switching into new employment.” Quoting also McGrath (1999, p.14): “an entrepreneur might disband an economically profitable business if other activities appear more lucrative or interesting” (see also, among the others, Watson and Everett, 1993, 1996; Headd, 2003, DeTienne et al., 2008).

To summarize, high-profile human capital characteristics may raise the opportunity costs of running the firm during an industry crisis, as the entrepreneur may receive higher returns from switching to alternative occupations, and this may actually determine a greater exit of skilled rather than unskilled entrepreneurs from the industry experiencing the negative shock.

Notwithstanding the relevance of the topic, the theoretical analysis addressing the issue of the possible arise of adverse selection phenomena during an industry crisis is quite scarce, if not totally lacking (as far as we know, the only theoretical article considering this issue is Holmes and Schmitz, 1990, which however assume the existence of adverse selection instead of investigating on the conditions that determine the insurgence of the phenomenon). Allegedly, the present study is novel in two important aspects. The first part of the article is dedicated to the development of a simple theoretical framework addressing the issue of adverse selection in entrepreneurship during an industry-specific crisis. More specifically, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition for such phenomenon to occur. In the second part of the paper we investigate adverse selection in entrepreneurship from an empirical point of view. The general contention in the empirical literature analysing the role of human capital in the performance of the entrepreneurial activity is that entrepreneur’ human capital positively affects the continuation of the entrepreneurial activity (Delmar and Shane, 2006; Santarelli and Vivarelli, 2007). However, the available evidence is far from being conclusive: many studies found a significant positive impact on survival of the entrepreneurial activity for only some of several measures of entrepreneur’ human capital investigated (Brüderl et al., 1992; Cooper et al., 1994; Gimeno et al., 1997; Pennings et al., 1998; Taylor, 1999; Van Praag, 2003; Åstebro and Bernhardt, 2003; Thompson, 2005; Delmar and Shane, 2006), while others did not document any significant effect at all or found a negative relationship (Bates, 1989; Nafziger and Terrel, 1996; Cressy, 1996; Storey and Wynarczyk, 1996; Shane and Stuart, 2002; Grilli 2009). In this respect, w take advantage of a sort of “natural experiment” that occurred in the ICT sector. In particular we analyse the exit behaviour during the very specific
(compared to the rest of the economy) telecom and dot.com bust occurred between early 2000 to 2003 for a sample of Italian ICT start-up companies created during the boom period of 1995 to early 2000.¹ Results document that a relevant adverse selection process is likely to have characterized the Italian ICT sector during the bust period: a relatively higher level of human capital endowment has actually induced the entrepreneurs to leave the start-up and opt for alternative employment opportunities during the industry-specific recession.

**Theoretical model**

In what follows, we propose a simple theoretical framework to investigate on the effects of a crisis arising in industry $i$ on the decision of an agent endowed with human capital and entrepreneurship ability and facing the dilemma of continuing to be an entrepreneur in industry $i$ or choosing an alternative option. Examples of alternative options are being a salaried worker in sector $i$ or being a salaried worker or an entrepreneur in sector $j \neq i$.

Suppose that exist $E$ types of agents, indexed with $e=1,2,...,E$, where $e$ defines the human capital level: higher $e$ implies higher human capital level. There is a continuum of agents for each type-$e$. Suppose that the distribution of type-$e$ agents is given by $f_e(x_e)$, with $x_e \in [x_e,\bar{x}_e]$, where $x_e$ indicates the entrepreneurial ability of the specific type-$e$ agent $x$. Assume that $x_e \geq \bar{x}_e \ \forall e> e$, i.e. those agents with higher human capital have also higher entrepreneurial ability (Becker, 1975; Gimeno et al.; 1997, Almus and Nerlinger, 1999; Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Let us introduce a parameter, $\gamma \in (-\infty, +\infty)$, which describes the economic situation of sector $i$: the higher is $\gamma$, the worse is the economic situation of sector $i$, and vice-versa. Therefore, if $\gamma$ increases, we say that there is an industry crisis². The profits of entrepreneur $x_e$ in industry $i$ are given by: $\pi_e = \nu_e - k_e (x_e, \gamma)$. The term $\nu_e$ increases with $x_e$, and $\nu_e > \nu_e \ \forall e> e$: this implies that the higher is human capital and/or entrepreneurial ability, the higher are the profits. The term $k_e$ refers to the sensitivity of the profits to the variation of the economic situation in sector $i$. Assume that $k_e$ increases with $\gamma$: that is, profits decrease during an industry crisis (and increase during a boom). Let us define: $\rho_e = \partial k_e / \partial \gamma$.

Suppose that that the best alternative option each agent has depends only on her human capital (if the best alternative option is represented by being a salaried worker in industry $i$ or in another

¹ For an analogous periodisation (and description) of the telecom boom and bust, see Fransman (2004).

² Of course, if $\gamma$ decreases, we say that there is an industry boom. However, since the empirical analysis concerns a crisis period, in what follows we consider only the case of increasing $\gamma$ (crisis). Note that the analysis is focused on an industry-specific crisis, i.e. a crisis that regards a specific sector in the economy, and not on a global crisis, i.e. a crisis that involves the whole economy.
industry), or on her human capital and her entrepreneurial ability (if the best alternative option is represented by being a entrepreneur in industry \(j \neq i\)). We assume that when there is a crisis in sector \(i\), the best alternative salary/profits weakly decreases. Define with \(\alpha_e = -\partial w^e(\gamma)/\partial \gamma\), where \(\alpha_e \geq 0\) and \(e = 1, 2, \ldots, E\), the sensitivity of type-\(e\) best alternative salary or profits to a variation of the economic situation (in case of profits, \(\alpha_e\) is a function also of \(x_e\)). We assume that profits in industry \(i\) are more sensitive than the best alternative option of any agent to a variation of the economic situation in industry \(i\). This assumption can be rationalized by noticing that if the best alternative option is being a salaried worker in industry \(i\) or in industry \(j \neq i\), wages paid to workers are subject to contractual agreement between employers and employees (or unions representing categories of employees), and therefore they cannot be modified in a very short time, while if the best alternative option is being an entrepreneur in industry \(j \neq i\), it is reasonable to assume that profits in industry \(j \neq i\) are less affected than profits in industry \(i\) by a crisis arising in industry \(i\). Therefore, we assume: \(\rho_e \geq \alpha_e, \forall x, e\).

**The adverse selection condition**

Suppose that each type-\(e\) agent has to decide whether to be an entrepreneur in industry \(i\) or choose the best alternative option. She chooses to be an entrepreneur in industry \(i\) if her profits are higher than the best alternative salary or profits (Becker, 1975; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Bates, 1995). Denote by \(x_e^*\) the marginal type-\(e\) agent: she is the agent who is indifferent between being an entrepreneur in industry \(i\) or choosing the best alternative option. The marginal type-\(e\) agent is the solution of: \(\pi_{e,i}(x_e^*, \gamma) = w^e(\gamma)\).\(^3\) Type-\(e\) agents such that \(x_e \in [x_e^*(\gamma), \bar{x}_e]\) are entrepreneurs, while type-\(e\) agents with \(x_e \in [\bar{x}_e, x_e^*(\gamma)]\) choose the best alternative option. Therefore, the number\(^4\) of type-\(e\) entrepreneurs in industry \(i\) is given by \(I_e = \int_{x_e^*(\gamma)}^{\bar{x}_e} f_e(x_e)dx_e\). Let \(F_e\) be the primitive of \(f_e(x_e)\) in \([x_e^*(\gamma), \bar{x}_e]\). Then: \(\partial F_e/\partial x_e = f_e(x_e), \forall x_e \in [x_e^*(\gamma), \bar{x}_e]\). The number of type-\(e\) entrepreneurs in industry \(i\) can be rewritten as: \(I_e = F_e(\bar{x}_e) - F_e(x_e^*(\gamma))\). The impact of an industry crisis on the number of type-\(e\) entrepreneurs in industry \(i\) is captured by the derivative of \(I_e\) with respect to \(\gamma\): \(\frac{\partial I_e}{\partial \gamma} = -f(x_e^*) \cdot \frac{\partial x_e^*(\alpha_e, \rho_e)}{\partial \gamma}\). Clearly, the sign of the variation of the type-\(e\) number of

---

\(^3\) In the case where the best alternative option is represented by being an entrepreneur in a industry different from the one where the crisis emerges, the condition simply becomes: \(\pi_{e,i}(x_e^*, \gamma) = w^e(x_e^*, \gamma)\).

\(^4\) We use the term “number” for expositional simplicity, but since there is a continuum of individuals we mean “measure”.

---
entrepreneurs depends on the sign of the term \( \frac{\partial x^*_e}{\partial \gamma} \): if \( \frac{\partial x^*_e}{\partial \gamma} > 0 \), the marginal type-\( e \) agent is more located to the right in the \( f_e(\cdot) \) distribution during the industry crisis, and the number of type-\( e \) entrepreneurs decreases; if \( \frac{\partial x^*_e}{\partial \gamma} < 0 \), the opposite holds. Define 
\[
L_e(x, \gamma) = \pi_{x,e}(x, \gamma) - w^e(\gamma).
\]
Note that condition \( \pi_{x,e}(x^*_e, \gamma) = w^e(\gamma) \) is the same as: 
\[
L(x^*_e, \gamma) = 0.
\]
Taking the derivative of \( L_e \) with respect to \( \gamma \), we get: \( \alpha_e - \rho_e \). Therefore, \( L_e \) decreases with \( \gamma \) when \( \rho_e \geq \alpha_e \), which is true by assumption for every \( x \) and \( e \): it follows that during an industry crisis the number of entrepreneurs reduces for every human capital level, since \( x^*_e \) increases.\(^5\) Moreover, the higher is \( \rho_e - \alpha_e \) the more the marginal type-\( e \) agent after the crisis is distant from the marginal type-\( e \) agent before the crisis, which implies a greater reduction in the number of type-\( e \) entrepreneurs.

This allows us to derive a brief condition for the emerging of the adverse selection phenomenon during an industry crisis. Since adverse selection refers to the case where the entrepreneurs with high human capital are more likely than the entrepreneurs with low human capital to stop to run the firms during an industry crisis, in our framework adverse selection requires that \( \frac{\partial L_e}{\partial \gamma} \) increases with \( e \), which in turn amounts to require that \( \rho_e - \alpha_e \) increases with \( e \). Henceforth, the necessary and sufficient condition for adverse selection in entrepreneurship arising during an industry crisis can be summarized as follows:

- **Necessary and sufficient condition for adverse selection in entrepreneurship:** \( \frac{\partial \rho_e}{\partial e} \geq \frac{\partial \alpha_e}{\partial e} \).

Using the necessary and sufficient condition for adverse selection in entrepreneurship we stated above, we can immediately derive the factors which make adverse selection more likely to occur:

**Result:** all else being equal, adverse selection is stronger the more (less) the profits (the best alternative option) of high-profile human capital entrepreneurs are sensitive to economic situation.

**Empirical test**

We try to test the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena in entrepreneurship taking advantage of one of the most impetuous up side down experienced by a single sector with respect to the whole economic system: the boom and bust period investing the ICT sector around the year 2000. This represents an ideal testbed and a sort of “natural experiment” for investigating the potential relevance of the adverse selection phenomenon. First, the boom period was

---

\(^5\) If the assumption \( \rho \geq \alpha_e \) is removed, a more general condition for the variation in the number of type-\( e \) entrepreneurs can be easily derived: the number of type-\( e \) entrepreneurs decreases (increases) during an industry crisis if and only if the sensitivity of the profits of the marginal type-\( e \) agent to the economic situation is higher (lower) than the sensitivity of the type-\( e \) best alternative option.
characterized by an enormous and to some extent irrational euphoria that led to the birth of a great number of start-ups entering the sector with high and often unrealistic expectations (Fransman 2004). Second, the bust period was intense and dolorous but pretty much confined to the ICT and related sectors and spread with much less virulence in the whole economy. Between 1995 and 2000, the ICT sector experienced a dramatic boom, as the worldwide ICT growth rate during this period registered an average increase of around 10% per year (EITO 2004). Starting in mid-2000, the sector entered into a gloomy recession period and registered a global annual growth rate of 2.7% in 2001 and -0.4% in 2002, followed by a very slow recovery of 0.8% in 2003 (EITO 2004). The Italian ICT sector both at that time (and today) represents a small share of the global market; it accounted for 2.9% of the global ICT market in 2003, with 3.3% and 2.4% accounting for telecommunications and information technology, respectively. Notably, the Italian ICT sector did not deviate from the above sketched worldwide dynamics; from the peaks of the boom period, the annual growth rate dropped to a low of -0.5% in 2002 and then registered only a modest rate of 0.1% in 2003 (Assinform 2006).

Data

We consider a sample of 179 Italian ICT start-up companies that operate in service industries: multimedia content, software, Internet services (e-commerce, ISP, web-related services), and telecommunication services. Sample firms were established during the boom period: between 1995 and the first quarter of 2000 and were independent at start-up time (i.e., they were not controlled by another business organisation). The sample of ICT start-up firms was extracted from the database developed by the RITA (Research on Entrepreneurship in Advanced Technologies) Observatory at Politecnico di Milano. The primary source of information from which RITA data were collected consists of a series of national surveys administered in the first semesters of the years 2000, 2002 and 2004. Data on sample firms come from the first round. The survey was based on a questionnaire that was sent to the contact person in the target firms (i.e., one of the owner-managers) either by fax or by e-mail. The first section of the questionnaire provides detailed information on the human capital characteristics of the firm’s founders. The second section comprises further questions concerning the characteristics of the firm, including the year of foundation and the dynamics in the number of employees. Answers to the questionnaire were checked for internal coherence by trained personnel and were compared with information published in annual reports (as in the case of number of employees) and in the press. In several cases, phone or face-to-face follow-up interviews were conducted with owner-managers to obtaining missing data and ensure that data were reliable. The eventual survival or exit from markets of sample firms
between the second quarter of 2000 and 2003 was gathered in the second and third questionnaire rounds in 2002 and 2004. We collected information on sample firms being acquired by other firms directly from the survey respondents. Data on firm closure and acquisition for non-respondents were obtained from official documentation provided by the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce. As to the 124 still independent start-ups (69.3%), information is available on whether ICT service start-ups experienced some entrepreneurial exit from the original entrepreneurial team during the bust period. Again data were collected directly from respondents and checked and completed if necessary by the means of the dataset Telemaco provided by the Union of Italian Chambers of Commerce.

**Specification of the econometric analysis**

We estimate an ordered logit model on the degree of erosion of the original entrepreneurial team during the bust period with respect to the level of human capital possessed by entrepreneurs. The dependent variable takes a value of 0 if the degree of erosion is null (i.e. no leave of a founder), a value of 1 if some erosion process in the founding team occurred (i.e. leave of one or more founders but still some founders in) and 2 for a total disband of the founding team (i.e. no founders in the firm, because of closure or acquisition). As to independent variables, variables of founder human capital include: educational attainment (Education), measured by the mean number of years of education of founders; pre-entry work experience gained in the same industry as the start-up company (Specific work experience), and in different sectors (Generic work experience), both measured by the mean number of years of professional experience of founders before firm foundation; and managerial experience (Managerial experience), which is a dummy variable capturing the presence within the founding team of one or more founders with a prior management position in a company. Beyond these covariates, we also control for the size of the founding team (Founders). Then, strictly following the empirical literature on firm survival and top management team changes in entrepreneurial ventures, models also include the following control variables: size

---

6 The institution registers all business activities on the basis of fiscal codes and provides (upon payment request) eventual exit information on firms along time. Note also that reliability of data on firm exit was checked by inspecting (when available) firms' websites.

7 As customary in empirical studies on the impact of human capital on firm performances (see, e.g., Colombo and Grilli 2005, 2009), education and pre-entry work experience variables are introduced into models as “averages” instead of “total sums” across founders. This specification, which also includes the number of founders as an independent variable, allows to disentangle the truly qualitative effect of human capital covariates from merely quantitative aspects. However note that replacing “average” education and work experience variables with the corresponding sums of the years of education and work experience of founders brings very similar results to those exposed in the next paragraph (results are available upon request from the author).
measured in terms of logarithm of employees at the end of 1999 (Size),\(^8\) age of the firm (Age) and access to external sources of financing at start-up time (Bank debt). Finally, an industry dummy variable (Internet) differentiates start-up companies active in Internet services (e-commerce, ISP, web-related services) from the others.

Definitions of explanatory variables and some descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Table 2 highlights the correlation matrix between the explanatory variables.

**Results**

Results are reported in Table 3. Except for the variable Managerial experience which shows a negative and largely insignificant coefficient, all the other founder human capital variables point to the occurrence of an important adverse selection process going on in the Italian ICT sector during the industry downturn. The variable Education shows a positive and close to significance coefficient (p-value < 0.15) and both typology of work experience (Specific work experience and Generic work experience) exert a significant positive impact at 95% on the degree of erosion of the founding team. Overall, higher levels of human capital possessed by founders are associated to a higher probability of decomposition of the original top management team during the industry-specific recession. As to control variables, operating in the most novel ICT market segment (i.e. being a dot.com) raises the probability of the start-up to experience erosion in the founding team. Conversely, Bank debt exhibits a significant negative impact (95% level), suggesting that bank loans may represent relevant barriers to exit for entrepreneurs. The result is also in line with other studies (e.g. Åstebro and Bernhardt 2003) that highlight how having a bank loan would reveal a greater commitment by entrepreneurs in running the new firm and a consequent superior reluctance to exit from the entrepreneurial venture. Other control variables turn out to not significantly impact the dependent variable.

**Robustness checks and further insights**

As a first preliminary robustness check, we run an ordered probit model which specifies a different functional form for the error terms of the equation. Estimation results are very similar to the findings highlighted above (column 1 of Table 4): in terms of founder human capital variables, Education is positive and again close to significance and both Generic and Specific work experience variables are found to positively and significantly impact the degree of erosion of founding teams.

---

\(^8\) Employment is commonly used as proxy for firm size in firm survival studies (see, e.g., Mata et al. 1995; Audretsch et al. 1999; Esteve-Perez et al. 2004; Dunne et al. 2005; Esteve-Perez and Manez-Castillejo 2006; Strotmann 2007). Different measures such as total assets (e.g., Agarwal and Audretsch 2001) or physical output (e.g., Thompson 2005) are less frequent. Note that the use of total amount of capital at foundation as an alternative measure of firm size brings very similar results (available upon request from the author) to those presented in the next paragraph.
Then, we estimated a multinomial probit model (column 2-4 of Table 4) where the dependent variable takes 1 if the firm experienced the leave of at least one founder since foundation, 2 if it closed operations and 3 if it merged to or have been acquired by another firm. In fact, one may argue that these phenomena albeit being related are rather different events and consequently they should be kept separated in the empirical strategy. Results confirm the positive influence of the continuous founder human capital variables on all the three possible outcomes but also highlight some interesting differences in the statistical significance of the impact of human capital attributes to different exit routes. In particular, the leave of at least one founder from the original team appears to be driven especially by their educational level, closure by generic and to a less extent specific work experience and M&A by the specific component of work experience and again education.9

Finally, since the decision concerning firm exit (e.g. closure and M&A) and to some extent also the individual decision to leave the firm in a non-single founded venture has to be agreed and mediated with the other components of the top management team, one may suppose that the relationship between founder human capital and the degree of erosion of the original entrepreneurial team may be influenced by these intra-team relational dynamics. To this purpose, we also estimated the main model only on the single-founded start-ups (column 5 of Table 4). Despite the dramatic reduction in sample size, still the results are totally in line with those previously exposed.

**Concluding remarks**

The aim of this study is to explore both theoretically and empirically the possibility that during an industry-specific negative shock the usual positive relationship between founder human capital and the entrepreneurial status condition may actually be reversed: high-skilled and educated entrepreneurs rather than low-profile ones could be more likely to leave the new-borned firm and opt for alternative opportunities. Theoretically, we investigate the formal conditions under which this possibility becomes real. From an empirical point of view, we highlight that such adverse selection phenomenon did effectively take place in a specific episode: under the severe industry recession that hit the ICT sector during the 2000-2003 period, high human capital profile entrepreneurs of Italian start-ups created in the sector during the boom period 1995-early 2000 were found on average to be more likely than low skilled ones to quit the just started new entrepreneurial venture.

So the study enlarges our understanding on the negative effects that industry crises exert on the economic systems and adds to the picture another important element. To the extent that sectorial negative shocks not only produce those adverse selection phenomena here highlighted on the entrepreneurs but also on the innovative, valuable and often highly idiosyncratic business ideas

---

9 For an explanation on the reasons why the specific work experience may be more conducive to M&A while the generic component may be more associated to the closure route see Grilli (2009).
these latter bring along, the loss in terms of social welfare that economic crises are responsible for should also take into account this drastic reduction in the dynamic efficiency of the economic system.

REFERENCES


### Tables and Figures

**Table 1 – Definition of explanatory variables**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory variables</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Founders</td>
<td>Number of founders</td>
<td>2.888</td>
<td>1.741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Average number of years of education of founders</td>
<td>15.096</td>
<td>2.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific work experience</td>
<td>Average number of years of work experience of founders in the same sector of the start-up before firm’s foundation</td>
<td>3.754</td>
<td>6.742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generic work experience</td>
<td>Average number of years of work experience of founders in sectors other than that of the start-up before firm’s foundation</td>
<td>7.855</td>
<td>7.784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial experience</td>
<td>Value of 1 for firms with one or more founders with a prior management position in a company</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size</td>
<td>Logarithm of number of employees at the end of 1999</td>
<td>1.386</td>
<td>1.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank debt</td>
<td>Value of 1 for firms which have obtained a bank debt at firm’s foundation</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>0.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Number of years from 2000 to firm’s foundation</td>
<td>3.201</td>
<td>1.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>Value of 1 for firms operating in Internet services (e-commerce, ISP, web-related services)</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>0.465</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend. Number of observations is 179.

**Table 2 – Correlation matrix of the explanatory variables of the econometric model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Founders</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Education</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Specific work experience</td>
<td>-0.134</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Generic work experience</td>
<td>-0.029</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
<td>-0.419</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Managerial experience</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.233</td>
<td>0.111</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Size</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.198</td>
<td>0.079</td>
<td>0.050</td>
<td>0.173</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Bank debt</td>
<td>-0.198</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.090</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>-0.119</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Age</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>-0.098</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>0.069</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Internet</td>
<td>-0.043</td>
<td>-0.096</td>
<td>-0.095</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.118</td>
<td>-0.030</td>
<td>-0.154</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend. Number of observations is 179.
Table 3 – Founders’ human capital and erosion of founding teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Ordered Logit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$a_1$ Founders</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.096)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_2$ Education</td>
<td>0.086 (0.060)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_3$ Specific work experience</td>
<td>0.072 (0.029)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_4$ Generic work experience</td>
<td>0.050 (0.024)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_5$ Management experience</td>
<td>-0.472 (0.385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_6$ Size</td>
<td>-0.024 (0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_7$ Bank debt</td>
<td>-1.000 (0.430)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_8$ Age</td>
<td>0.081 (0.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a_9$ Internet</td>
<td>1.414 (0.373)**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Log-likelihood function: -173.867
Wald test ($\chi^2$): all parameters=0: 22.00 (9)**
Wald test ($\chi^2$): $a_2 = a_3 = a_4 = a_5 = 0$: 7.76 (4)*
pseudo $R^2$: 0.07

Legend. Significance levels: * >90%; ** >95%; *** >99%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Number of observations is 179.
## Table 4 – Robustness checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model Columns</th>
<th>Ordered probit</th>
<th>Multinomial probit</th>
<th>Ordered probit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td>Erosion of founding teams</td>
<td>Leave of at least one founder</td>
<td>Closure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a1</td>
<td>Founders</td>
<td>0.001 (0.057)</td>
<td>0.130 (0.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a2</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.050 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.118 (0.073)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a3</td>
<td>Specific work experience</td>
<td>0.042 (0.017)**</td>
<td>0.021 (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a4</td>
<td>Generic work experience</td>
<td>0.029 (0.014)**</td>
<td>0.022 (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a5</td>
<td>Management experience</td>
<td>-0.308 (0.233)</td>
<td>-0.033 (0.396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a6</td>
<td>Size</td>
<td>-0.004 (0.092)</td>
<td>-0.111 (0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a7</td>
<td>Bank debt</td>
<td>-0.608 (0.259)**</td>
<td>-0.450 (0.431)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a8</td>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.039 (0.067)</td>
<td>0.235 (0.111)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a9</td>
<td>Internet</td>
<td>0.852 (0.216)***</td>
<td>0.664 (0.344)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| N° of observations | 179 | 179 | 28 |
| Log-likelihood function | -173.811 | -197.114 | -14.685 |
| Wald test ($\chi^2$): all parameters = 0 | 24.73 (9)*** | 63.53 (27)*** | 21.71 (8)*** |
| pseudo $R^2$ | 0.07 | - | 0.42 |

**Legend.** Significance levels: * >90%; ** >95%; *** >99%. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Elenco Quaderni già pubblicati

66. L. Colombo, M. Grillo, *Collusion when the Number of Firms is Large*, marzo 2006.
75. A. Baglioni, *Corporate Governance as a Commitment and Signalling Device*, novembre 2007.
81. A. Baglioni, Shareholders’ Agreements and Voting Power, Evidence from Italian Listed Firms, maggio 2008.
84. M. F. Ambrosanio, M. Bordignon, F. Cerniglia, Constitutional reforms, fiscal decentralization and regional fiscal flows in Italy, dicembre 2008.
86. L. Colombo, G. Weinrich, Persistent disequilibrium dynamics and economic policy, marzo 2009.
89. A. Baglioni, M. Grillo, Calamità naturali e assicurazione: elementi di analisi per una riforma, settembre 2009.
91. A. Baglioni, Liquidity crunch in the interbank market: is it credit or liquidity risk, or both?, novembre 2009.
93. A. Baglioni, A. Boitani, M. Liberatore, A. Monticini, Is the leverage of European Commercial Banks Pro-Cyclical?, maggio 2010
94. M. Bordignon, S. Piazza, Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy, maggio 2010
95. S. Colombo, Bertrand and Cournot in the unidirectional Hotelling model, maggio 2010
98. S. Colombo, L. Grilli, Another unconsidered sinister effect of industry-specific crises? On the possible emergence of adverse selection phenomena on the survival of entrepreneurial ventures, luglio 2010