

## **Towards a global and transformed NATO via a better EU?**

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Healthy organizations have to transform themselves, without adaptation they could become irrelevant. NATO has a history of adapting itself: it adapted its strategic concepts in 1952, 1967, 1991 and 1999, and is actually in a transformation process.

NATO's transformation since the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its Communist Alliance, the Warsaw Pact, happened in five ways.

First -- NATO enlarged with ten former communist countries. Now there are 26 members, with Albania and Croatia joining formally NATO in April 2009 there will be 28. The military elites of the former communist countries were socialized by working together with their western colleagues.

Secondly -- Originally NATO was designed to contain the expansion of the Communist influence and defend Western Europe. The geographical area was restricted by its founders. The enemy was known, as were the legal reasons for the eventual use of force. In the post Cold War period, NATO got directly involved in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan and assisted the African Union mostly logistically in missions in Darfur and Somalia. It is still playing a role in Iraq's transition. It still executes its article 5 operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea. It is also active in the fight against piracy along the coast of Somalia. All these missions are what we call the out-of-area campaigns.

Thirdly -- NATO accepted in Washington in 1999, on its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary, that terrorism coming from foreign countries is an act of war.

Fourthly -- NATO has established a worldwide web through its various partnership programs: Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue (7 countries), Istanbul cooperation Initiative (Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain...)

Fifthly -- NATO is an omnipotent player. Today, it is offensive and active in businesses as diverse as climate warming, education, demographic situation, energy

security... Doesn't NATO have to shortlist priorities? Choices must be made. Too often the question is what can be done, rather than what needs to be done. NATO is afraid of becoming irrelevant so it tries to do everything and everywhere.

For the development of NATO, Europe is essential. So the attitude of Europe is crucial for the future of NATO. Europeans and Americans have no alternative. We are condemned to work together. It's an inevitable alliance. We share almost the same on Christianity based values and that is exceptional.

As the world becomes bigger, Europe is becoming smaller. For the first time in 600 years Europe is neither the centre of conflict, nor of power. The real danger is that a little Europe will lead to a little NATO. That could condemn the West and its stable, organized power to decline. The center of power is moving eastward. The Asia-Pacific region is dynamic but unstable and this is a real danger for world peace

For a Grand Strategy we need a clear aim, the steps towards realization and the necessary means. The aim is collective, stable world security, the defence of our way of life and free movement for goods and people.

Let's shortlist what need to be done.

First -- Obviously collective defence remains the backbone of the Alliance. Balance-of-power politics is back, bringing with it a range of security policy implications. For that purpose we need robust forces: tanks, airplanes, submarines, carriers and strategic nuclear weapons. Actions against terrorism, also cyber terrorism (what happened in a massive scale in Estonia) are part of the collective defence. For that purpose we need good intelligence, commando's and rapid deployable forces.

Secondly -- We have to rethink the use of military force in non-article 5 operations and in the extreme without an explicit UN Security Council mandate. We did it in Kosovo. Stability in the world is essential. Access to energy and raw materials is vital for the Western world. The oceans must be safe and our people and goods should travel without fear. Let's look if the two major current operations, Iraq and Afghanistan, fit in the picture above. Do they coincide with our aims? I think Iraq is not vital. There must be an acceptable government. But it cannot be our objective to impose a democratic government. A stable government that doesn't threaten his neighbours and

gives a place to its minorities is the maximum we can hope for. In the case of Afghanistan, I understand that the US wanted to destroy the safe haven for terrorists that Afghanistan was after 9/11. It functioned as a sanctuary for many terrorists most of all for Al Qaeda. It was the breeding place for terrorists. The hard power was essential in the initial phase, to overthrow the Taliban regime. But now we need more and more soft power, to strengthen an acceptable government. We have to win the hearts and minds of the Afghani. Together with a lot of NGO, and other international organizations, NATO must foster a stable government.

Thirdly -- NATO has to rethink its relationship with other global players, first organizations like the EU (21 NATO countries are also member of EU), OSCE, UN, IMF and with countries as diverse as Russia, China, Japan, India, Brazil, South-Africa and Australia. I don't believe in NATO as a global player replacing the UN. NATO has to work with the EU as an entity. Not with the different countries separately. In that perspective there is no problem with unanimity. There will be a dialogue. We have to rethink also our relations with Russia. For 19 years we were hesitating between containment or even roll back and cooperation. Should it be treated as a difficult partner or as a strategic adversary? The Bush administration and East Europeans or should I say those of Central Europe think it is a strategic adversary. But most West Europeans and foremost the Germans prefer a difficult partner. Russia is at least a regional power and very important to us in countries and regions as diverse as the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia and North Korea and extremely precious for some global challenges: arms limitations, nuclear proliferation, climate protection and energy security. A new Cold War, even a small one, would undermine our agenda. Is Putin's Russia a danger to our democratic system? I don't believe so. During the Cold War we worked together with the communist regime of Tito, fascist Spain and the dictatorships in Greece and Turkey were even members of NATO. Fascist Portugal was one of the founding members. Russia is dependant on the export of oil and gas. The demographic situation is catastrophic. It's an empty country: 140 million inhabitants for such a huge country. We do need Russia's energy if we want to be able to sustain our economy and trade. We have to integrate that country into our system. We have so much in common, first of all Christianity. We have to avoid Russians being afraid of us. If that is their perception, we have to reassure them. When they are not afraid, they will be less a

threat to their rather small neighbours, especially in the Caucasus. NATO could become a real European security system or even a Northern Christian security system including Russia until Vladivostok. A global NATO would be a step too far.

Fourthly -- On enlargement. I think NATO should temporarily stop and digest the previous expansions. The uninterrupted eastward enlargement has contributed to a slowly deteriorating relationship with Russia. When we enlarge, it must be with Russia. But the first new wave of enlargement should be with the EU non NATO members: Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Austria, Malta and Cyprus. On the other hand, the EU should enlarge with European countries member of NATO such as Norway and Iceland. We must be extremely careful with countries like Ukraine and Georgia. The Eastern part of Ukraine is Russian speaking. In the Crimea region, where an important part of the Russian fleet is stationed, is a Russian and Tatar speaking majority. Georgia behaved very badly with his minorities in 1992-1993 and again in South-Ossetia in August 2008. The Russian military invasion protected the Ossetian population, but was also an answer to the unilateral recognition of the independence of Kosovo. France is another difficult partner, but it is a country with an idea, a good army and with it's reintegration in the military structure it will strengthen the European pillar and ultimately NATO.

Fifthly (and perhaps in the near future most importantly) -- the United States and the EU must re-establish a new working relation. A decision or decisions are necessary. We have to avoid transatlantic controversies that could brake up the Alliance -- remember the Iraq crisis of 2002-2003. Of course, there have always been tensions. But generally they have strengthened the alliance. NATO became better, more flexible. The contrast with what happened in the Warsaw pact was huge. During the Iraq crisis differences were bigger and more dangerous. France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg didn't accept the unilateralism of the Bush administration. But don't forget that unilateralism is deeply rooted in the United States, or should I say in the most powerful country of the moment.

Perhaps Europe is too optimistic and the United States too pessimistic. The EU Security Strategy of 2003 opens with the observation "Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure, nor so free", while the US Security Strategy of 2006 opens with the statement: "America is at war". At the eve of the venue of Obama, the National

Intelligence Council (NIC) published its *Global Trends 2025*. In that document is described, based on seven parameters, a little decline of the US and a big decline of Europe and Japan. Will the new tandem Obama-Clinton succeed in having a real dialogue with Europe? The Bush administration's unilateral attitude gave Europe an excuse to limit its military expenditures. With a real dialogue, it will be difficult to continue sheltering under the US umbrella. I hope that Europe will speak as a whole and not be extremely divided between Old and New Europe, Atlantic and Continental Europe, big and small countries, Anglo-Saxon oriented and Latin oriented ...

I think we have to share the military burden and of course also the decision-making. I see that the US is focusing on fighting or hard power and Europe on staying a soft power.

Of course we need highly deployable and sustainable armed forces, but we also need, perhaps necessary in some years, a critical mass that can operate across the conflict spectrum and over both time and distance. We need high-end forces and forces able to stabilize and reconstruct. The Alliance must accept that both are important. Within the Alliance, we can specialize but there must be enough fighting power in Europe, and the US must also work on stabilizing forces.

The US has now about 1,5 million military people, nearly 160 000 are abroad mostly as fighting power. The EU has 2 million soldiers, 80 000 are abroad, mostly as stabilizing forces. We have to strengthen the cooperation between the NRF (NATO Response Force) and the EU Battlegroups. To solve the discussions about financial burden let's accept a fixed percentage of our GNP for our military expenditures for ex. 2%.

In Europe only a better organization, even defence integration, will offer the possibility of a cost-effective military power. There must also be a real European foreign policy so that we can effectively discuss – at the same level - with the United States and Russia.

We need a better NATO, but a better European Union is more than necessary to achieve that goal. Within NATO, the EU must act as an entity. Isn't it symbolic that the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of NATO 3-4 April 2009 will be commemorated in two towns the German Kehl and just opposite on the other bank of the Rhine the French Strasbourg?

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